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COMMENTS

ENTRAPMENT, DE LOREAN AND THE
UNDERCOVER OPERATION: A
CONSTITUTIONAL CONNECTION
In baiting a mousetrap with cheese,
always leave room for the mouse. *
On October 19, 1982, four men gathered secretly in a Los Angeles hotel room to conclude a multimillion dollar cocaine deal.1 The
group consisted of the familiar elements of a modern drug conspiracy: a financier, a dealer, a distributor, and a profiteer. 2 After inspecting several pounds of the cocaine and pronouncing it "better
than gold, ' 3 the participants joined in a champagne toast dedicated
*
TIONS

Saki, The Square Egg (1924), quoted in BARTLETT'S FAMILIAR QUOTA-

904(b) (14th ed. 1968).

1. For a general discussion of the events preceding the arrest of John Z.
De Lorean on October 19, 1982, see generally Hoover, A Trial of Images: Do the
Secret Tapes Show the Real John De Lorean, NAT'L LAW J., July 2, 1984, at 1
[hereinafter cited as Hoover, A Trial of Images].
2. See Prosecution's Trial Memorandum Re: Entrapment, Exhibits,
United States v. De Lorean, No. CR82-910(A)-RMT (C.D. Cal. 1982) (attached
exhibits identifying individuals present at time of arrest) [hereinafter cited as
Prosecution'sEntrapment Memorandum].
There were several parties at the hotel room meeting. The "financier" or
banker was Federal Bureau of Investigation Special Agent Benedict Tisa
(whose cover name was "James Benedict"). The "dealer" or intermediary was a
paid government undercover informant named James Timothy Hoffman. The
"distributor" or individual who purportedly was to supply the contacts was Federal Bureau of Investigation Special Agent John Valestra (whose cover name
was "Mr. Vicenza"). The "profiteer" was John Z. De Lorean, who was to receive a $60 million "investment" in the ailing De Lorean Motor Company. See
Notice of Motion and Motion to Dismiss for Outrageous Government Conduct,
Memorandum of Points and Authorities, Request for Evidentiary Hearing,
Declarationat 3-5, United States v. De Lorean, No. CR82-910-RMT (C.D. Cal.
1982) [hereinafter cited as Defendant's Outrageous Government Conduct Memorandum]; Government's Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss for Alleged Outrageous Government Conduct, Memorandum of Points and
Authorities, at 4-7, United States v. De Lorean, No. CR82-910(A)-RMT (C.D.
Cal. 1982) [hereinafter cited as Government's Outrageous Government Conduct
Memorandum].
3. Prosecution's Entrapment Memorandum, supra note 2, at "exhibits"
(statement of Mr. John Z. De Lorean during recorded conversation of hotel
meeting on October 19, 1982); Hoover, A Trial of Images, supra note 1, at 1
(hotel meeting and conversation depicted).
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to "a lot of success for everybody." '4 Moments later, an agent of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation entered the hotel room and arrested the stunned toastmaster for conspiracy to traffic 55 pounds of
cocaine. 5 With the exception of the toastmaster, every participant
in the hotel room gathering was a government undercover agent
and was aware that the entire meeting had been recorded by a concealed videotape camera. 6 The sole exception was an internationally renowned, millionaire automaker, by the name of John
7
Zachary De Lorean.
News of the arrest sent shockwaves through the world media.'
After several prior successful "sting" operations, 9 it appeared that
the United States government, using a variety of undercover practices, 10 had once again produced a sensational arrest. Through the
use of electronic surveillance, paid informants, and careful planning, the FBI had effectively foiled a drug trafficking scheme valued at over $50 million. Yet, two years later, after a long and
4. Prosecution's Entrapment Memorandum, supra note 2, at "exhibits"
(statement of Mr. John Z. De Lorean during recorded conversation of hotel
meeting on October 19, 1982).
5. Marquis, Lawyers Speculate on Defense Tactics in De Lorean Case, L.A.
Daily J., November 11, 1982, at 1, col. 2 (discussing charges and defense options
of De Lorean case).
6. See supra note 2; Srodes & Fallon, Can De Lorean Get A FairTrial, L.A.
Times, reprinted in Chi. Sun Times, March 4, 1984, at 14 (discussion of De
Lorean case and use of secret surveillance).
7. See generally I. FALLON, DREAMMAKER: THE RISE AND FALL OF JOHN
DE LOREAN (1983) (life of automaker described); Berger, Maverick Entrepreneur in Drug Case, N.Y. Times, August 17, 1984, at B6, col. 3-5 (life of De
Lorean depicted).
8. Wilson, 'Simple' Drug Case Ends Its BizarreRun, Chi. Tribune, August
17, 1984, at sec. 1, p. 5, col. 3 (De Lorean case "made headlines throughout the
world."). As a result of the widespread publicity surrounding the De Lorean
trial, the trial court issued a closure of all pre-trial documents whereby such
documents would be initially filed in camera and under seal. United States v.
De Lorean, 561 F. Supp. 797 (C.D. Cal. 1983).
9. See, e.g., Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966) (labor leader convicted of jury tampering as a result of government undercover operation);
United States v. Myers, 527 F. Supp. 1206 (E.D.N.Y. 1982) (various congressmen,
a mayor, a state senator, city councilmen and others were successfully convicted
under ABSCAM), affd, 710 F.2d 915 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S.Ct. 702
(1984); United States v. Williams, 705 F.2d 603 (2d Cir.) (United States Senator
convicted for bribery as a result of successful ABSCAM undercover operations),
cert. denied, 104 S.Ct. 524 (1983); United States v. Jannotti, 673 F.2d 578 (3d
Cir.) (city councilmen successfully convicted under ABSCAM operation), cert.
denied, 102 S.Ct. 2906 (1982). See generally Gershman, Entrapment, Shocked
Consciences, and the Staged Arrest, 66 MINN. L. REV. 567 (1982) (examples of
sting operations discussed); Livermore, The Abscam Entrapment, 17 CRIM. L.
BULL. 69 (1981) (a brief discussion of the facts and theories of ABSCAM case);
Marx, Creative Policingor ConstitutionalThreat?,Civ. LIB. REV., July/August,
1977 at 34 (examples of successful and unsuccessful sting operations discussed).
10. See Wilson, supra note 8, at 5, col. 1 (De Lorean case had everything,
including informers, stolen tapes and 'blind' ambition). See, e.g., United States
v. Carpentier, 689 F.2d 21 (2d Cir. 1982) (bribery case describing tactics used by
government in ABSCAM investigations), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1108 (1983).
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highly-publicized trial, John De Lorean walked triumphantly from
a federal courthouse, acquitted by a jury of all charges stemming
from his arrest for drug trafficking." In the aftermath of the De
Lorean verdict, several issues remain unresolved concerning not
only his acquittal but the status of the law regarding government
undercover "sting" operations.
Some observers contend that the acquittal was the result of an
aberrant, legal legerdemain, symptomatic of a corrupt legal system
that responds favorably to the few who are wealthy enough to
bankroll an elaborate legal defense. 1 2 Others argue that John De
Lorean was a victim of overzealous law enforcement practices
which portend an erosion of individual liberty and the emergence of
an Orwellian police state. 1 3 This comment, however, proffers a different view. It examines the De Lorean case in relation to the troubled history of judicial reaction to government sponsored
undercover operations, and demonstrates that the acquittal in this
instance resulted from a confused confluence of two distinct legal
defenses, entrapment 14 and due process,'1 5 in the collective mind of
a modern jury. More importantly, the De Lorean verdict may serve
11. John De Lorean was acquitted on all eight counts of conspiring to smuggle $24 million worth of cocaine after 59 days of testimony on August 16, 1984.
See Boston Globe, August 17, 1984, at 1, col. 5; Wall St. J., August 17, 1984, at 1,
col. 3.
12. For example, one observer aptly expressed this sentiment by stating, "I
imagine there's different ways of manipulating the law if you have the money.
If it was me, I'd be on my way to jail by now." Boston Globe, August 17, 1984, p.
2, col. 5 (an article describing nationwide reaction to De Lorean verdict). Contra
Editorial, Chi. Tribune, August 19, 1984, § 5, p. 2, col. 1 ("People who want to
avoid facing up to the problem of the government's conduct will say that [De
Lorean] got off the hook because he had expensive lawyers.").
13. For example, Geoffrey R. Stone, University of Chicago law professor,
reacted to the De Lorean verdict by stating, "If this shows anything, it's that
government undercover activities of a highly intrusive nature with respect to
targets who are not themselves clearly appropriate targets of investigation, are
not investigations that the American public approve of." Chi. Tribune, August
19, 1984, § 5, p. 1, col. 1 (De Lorean verdict analyzed). For a discussion of the
prospects of an "Orwellian" society resulting from government undercover operations, see United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 770 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (developments in electronic surveillance make "technologically feasible
the Orwellian Big Brother"); Ehrlich, Sorrells-Entrapmentor Due Process? A
Redefinement of the EntrapmentDefense, N.Y. ST. B.J., July 1983, at 36 (warns
of police state and Orwellian society); Hodges, Electronic Visual Surveillance
and the Fourth Amendment: The Arrival of Big Brother, 3 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 261, 297 (1976) (1984 is a state of mind where the appearance of repression
has impact of reality); Kirby, Eight Years to 1984: Privacy and the Law, 5 J.
CoMP. & L. 487 (1976) (urges reform of privacy laws to forestall Orwellian society); Note, Due Process Privacy and the Path of Progress, 2 LAW F. 469, 523
(1979) (references to 1984 pervade privacy literature). But see Keisling, The
Case Against Privacy,STUDENT LAW., September 1984, at 25 (Orwellian prediction fundamentally wrong).
14. See infra notes 18-92 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 111-68 and accompanying text.
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as a catalyst for the rise of yet a third defense to offensive govern16
ment undercover operations: the right of privacy.
Although entrapment, due process, and the right of privacy are
often regarded as separate and unrelated legal theories by judges
and legal scholars, they are actually different aspects of the same
17
problem: lawless invasion of privacy by law enforcement agents.
In support of this contention, this comment begins by tracing the
origins and limits of the traditional entrapment defense. It then
shows how the limitations inherent in this defense have yielded a
new due process defense in cases involving outrageous government
conduct in planned, undercover operations. This comment then discusses how the due process defense ultimately will require courts to
consider more carefully the defendant's privacy interests jeopardized by such operations. Finally, several recommendations are
presented for clarifying and reforming this unsettled area of law.
ENTRAPMENT AND ITS PROGENY

The Origins of Entrapment Theory
The entrapment defense' s was first recognized by the United
States Supreme Court in 1932.19 In Sorrells v. United States, 20 a
federal prohibition agent, posing as a tourist, visited the defendant
and engaged him in a conversation about their common war experiences. 21 After gaining the defendant's confidence, the agent asked
for some liquor. After twice refusing the request, the defendant finally capitulated when he was asked a third time, and sold the
agent a five dollar bottle of moonshine liquor. The defendant was
subsequently prosecuted for violation of the National Prohibition
16. See infra notes 169-220 and accompanying text.
17. See Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. 323, 343-44 (1966) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting) ("lawless invasion of privacy" constitutes essential problem in cases
of government investigatory misconduct).
18. "Entrapment" is defined as the conception and planning of an offense
by an officer and his procurement of its commission by one who would not
have perpetrated it except for the trickery, persuasion, or fraud of the
officer.
Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 454 (1932) (Roberts, J., concurring).
Moreover, entrapment is an affirmative defense. Averritt v. State, 246 Miss. 49,
149 So.2d 320, cert. denied, 375 U.S. 5 (1963). See generally Magness, The Defense of Entrapment-DefinitionBases and Procedure,3 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 117
(1971) (discusses bases of entrapment); De Feo, Entrapment as a Defense to
Criminal Responsibility: Its History, Theory and Application, 1 U.S.F. L. REV.
243 (1967) ("subjective" test for entrapment discussed and defended).

19. Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435 (1932). The defense of entrapment was first recognized in the federal courts in Woo Wai v. United States, 223
F. 412 (9th Cir. 1915).
20. 287 U.S. 435 (1932). See generally Ehrlich, supra note 13, at 33 (Sorrells

discussed).
21. Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 439-41.
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22

In reversing the conviction on entrapment grounds, the Sorrells Court held that government agents were prohibited from instigating a criminal act by persons "otherwise innocent in order to
lure them to its commission and to punish them."23 Thus, over the
objection of four concurring justices, 24 the Supreme Court majority
focused on the defendant's intent or predisposition to commit the
crime. The Court relied on a theory of statutory construction and
reasoned that Congress could not have intended that its statutes
would be enforced by tempting otherwise innocent persons into vio25
lations of those statutes.
In 1958,26 the Supreme Court considered again the theory underlying entrapment and expressly re-affirmed the view adopted by
the Sorrells Court. In Sherman v. United States,27 a government
agent posed as a drug user at a drug rehabilitation clinic in order to
gain the confidence of the defendant. Although the defendant was
initially reluctant, he ultimately acceded to the repeated requests of
the government agent for a small quantity of drugs. In reversing
the defendant's conviction for the illegal sale of narcotics, the Sherman majority focused on the defendant's intent or predisposition
and his repeated reluctance to sell narcotics to the government
agent. Thus, the Court observed that, in determining whether entrapment has been established, "a line must be drawn between the
trap for the unwary innocent and the trap for the unwary crimi22. Id. at 439.
23. Id. at 448.
24. Id. at 455 (Roberts, J., concurring) (basis of entrapment should be public
policy concern for purity of courts).
25. Id. at 448. See also United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 428 (1973)
(statutory construction theory re-affirmed).
Under the statutory construction theory, the Supreme Court ruled that
Congress could not have intended that its statutes would be enforced by tempting innocent persons. Sorrells,287 U.S. at 448. The Court stated that it is bound
by public policy to construe federal statutes reasonably so as not "to do violence
to the spirit and purpose of the statute." Id. Thus, the Court interpreted the
criminal statutes as impliedly stating that entrapped defendants were to be excluded from their coverage.
The statutory construction basis of entrapment, however, is a baseless fiction. An entrapped defendant has committed the act made criminal by the statute. Moreover, the defendant has done so with the requisite mens rea,
notwithstanding that the criminal disposition may have developed after the
government's instigation of the criminal design. For a thoughtful criticism of
the statutory construction basis of entrapment, see Abramson & Linderman,
Entrapment and Due Process in the Federal Courts, 8 AM. J. CRIM. LAW 139,
149-50 (1980). Compare De Feo, supra note 18, at 255 (1967) (legislative intent
theory supported as absence of actus reus in entrapment cases) with Magness,
supra note 18, at 128 (entrapment based on absence of mens rea).
26. Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369 (1958) (second Supreme Court
case dealing with entrapment defense).
27. Id.
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nal." 28 While concurring in the result, four members of the Sherman Court disagreed with the majority's focus on predisposition
and argued that the conduct of the government should be the cen29
terpiece of entrapment analysis.
The Supreme Court has remained deeply divided since Sorrells
and Sherman concerning the basis and focus of the entrapment defense. Accordingly, the Court has had considerable difficulty articulating a consistent, meaningful standard for the defense. 30 This
disagreement has led to two distinct views of entrapment. The majority view is based on a theory of statutory construction and focuses on the "subjective" predisposition of the particular defendant
charged with the offense. 31 The minority view of entrapment, on
the other hand, is based on the judiciary's supervisory jurisdiction
over the administration of justice and focuses on the conduct of the
police. 32 Both views command significant support among judges
and legal scholars and often compel disparate results in cases involving a claim of entrapment.
The Majority View of Entrapment: A "Subjective" Test
The "subjective" view of entrapment continues to attract a bare
majority of Supreme Court justices, 33 and most state courts. 34 It has
been termed the "subjective"view because under this approach a
subjectively predisposed defendant is barred from raising the entrapment defense when the criminal design originates with the defendant and not with the government. 35 Courts adopting this view
reason that no entrapment can occur when the government merely
provides the opportunity for an "unwary criminal" to commit a
crime. In seeking to determine whether an individual is in fact an
28. Id. at 372.
29. Id. at 383 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). Accord Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 455
(Roberts, J., concurring).
30. See generally Comment, Entrapment. Sixty Years of Frustration,10
NEw ENG. L. REV. 179 (1974) (confusion in federal courts discussed).
31. For a general discussion of the subjective theory of entrapment, see
Park, The Entrapment Controversy, 60 MINN. L. REV. 163 (1976).
32. For a general discussion of the objective theory of entrapment, see Note,
Entrapment: Time to Take an Objective Look, 16 WASHBURN L.J. 324 (1977).
33. See Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484, 488-90 (1976) (denying the
defendant an entrapment defense due to defendant's predisposition); United
States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 433 (1973) (stating that the focus of the defense is
on the predisposition of the defendant to commit the crime); Sorrells v. United
States, 287 U.S. 435, 452 (1932) (majority adopts predisposition approach).
34. See, e.g., State v. Keating, 551 S.W.2d 589 (Mo. 1977) (adopts subjective
view of entrapment), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1071 (1978); People v. Calvano, 30
N.Y.2d 199, 282 N.E.2d 322, 331 N.Y.S.2d 430 (1972) (subjective view of an entrapment applied). For a comprehensive review of state courts which have
adopted the subjective view, see 62 A.L.R. 3d 110.
35. See Abramson & Linderman, supra note 25, at 144-45 (subjective entrapment explained).
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unwary criminal with a prior disposition towards committing an offense, the subjective test focuses on two slim reeds-predisposition
and inducement. 36 As central as these two concepts are to the subjective view, the Court has never defined or applied either term
37
with any degree of certainty.
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court continues to indicate that the
38
defendant's predisposition constitutes the "principal element" of
the entrapment defense. In an attempt to formulate a workable
definition of "predisposition," one lower court has stated that predisposition "connotes only a general intent or purpose to commit
the crime when an opportunity or facility is afforded for the commission thereof. '39 Under this formulation, specific intent to commit the specific offense prior to the government inducement need
not be shown by the prosecution. While there is considerable support for this general intent view, 40 such a view is difficult to reconcile with the cases in which the Supreme Court has upheld the
defense of entrapment. 41 The Court's analysis is not framed in
36. Park, supra note 31, at 176. See also Magness, supra note 18, at 118 (predisposition and inducement provide basis of subjective view).
37. See generally Seidman, The Supreme Court,Entrapmentand Our Criminal Justice Dilemma, 5 Sup. CT. REV. 111, 120-27 (1981) (uncertainty involved
in predisposition and inducement discussed).
38. Russell, 411 U.S. at 433. See generally Comment, Entrapment-Predisposition ofDefendant Crucial Factorin EntrapmentDefense, 59 CORNELL L. REV.
546 (1974) (traces role of predisposition in entrapment cases).
39. State v. Houpt, 210 Kan. 778, 782, 504 P.2d 570, 574 (1972).
40. See Sherman, 356 U.S. at 382 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
41. The Sorrells Court reversed the defendant's conviction based upon the
entrapment defense. Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 452. Interestingly, the Court never
expressly concluded that the defendant did not have the general intent to deal
in illicit liquor. In fact, several witnesses had testified that the defendant had a
general reputation as a "rum runner" notwithstanding his otherwise good character and commendable employment record. Id. at 441. Instead, the Court
merely found that the specific act for which the defendant was prosecuted, i.e.,
sale of one-half gallon of liquor to the agent, was instigated by the prohibition
agent. Surely, an individual capable of procurring a half gallon of liquor during
prohibition in a matter of minutes was not someone without at least some "general intent or purpose to commit the crime."
Similarly, in Sherman, the Court reversed a narcotics conviction based
upon the Sorrells analysis. Sherman, 356 U.S. at 376. Even though the defendant had twice been convicted of narcotic offenses, the Court found entrapment
as a matter of law. Arguably, a defendant who had a previous criminal record
and who was convicted of selling narcotics on several occasions to a government
agent possessed at least a "general intent" to commit the crime. The Court emphasized that Sherman was "innocent" apparently because he was seeking medical assistance for his addiction and not profiting from the narcotics sale. Both
Sorrells and Sherman seem to emphasize the initial reluctance of the defendant
to the inducement. Arguably, initial reluctance is as much indicative of a cautious criminal as it is an innocent predisposition and does not resolve the issue
of prior general intent. See, e.g., United States v. Glassel, 488 F.2d 143, 146 (9th
Cir. 1973) (court noted that reluctance may simply indicate a cautious hardened
criminal), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 941 (1974). Therefore, a defendant's general
intent does not explain the result in either Sorrells or Sherman.
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terms of the general intent of the accused to commit a crime. The
analysis in both Sorrells and Sherman focused on whether the government instigated the specific act for which the defendant was
prosecuted and whether such instigation was resisted by the defendant. 42 Thus, it is more likely that the Court is concerned with
the general lifestyle and character of the defendant rather than his
general intent.43 Under either approach, the Court's nebulous inquiry into predisposition is vulnerable to two criticisms.
First, an inquiry into the defendant's personal predisposition or
moral character is highly prejudicial. 44 Once a defendant has raised
the defense of entrapment by showing some evidence of government inducement, 45 the prosecution is permitted to rebut defendant's evidence by proving his predisposition beyond a reasonable
doubt. 46 In most criminal trials, evidence is deemed inadmissible if
it is based upon rumor or suspicion concerning a defendant's temperament or criminal tendencies. 47 Such evidence tends to focus
the jury on the character of the defendant rather than the acts allegedly committed in furtherance of a particular offense. 48 In cases
involving a claim of entrapment under the subjective view, however, the prosecution is allowed to introduce evidence of past crimi42. See, e.g., Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 441. Contra United States v. Glaeser, 550
F.2d 483, 487 (9th Cir. 1977) (affirming refusal of entrapment instruction in
fraud case because recorded conversation showed that defendant was predisposed notwithstanding feigned reluctance). See supra note 41.
43. Seidman, supra note 37, at 124. Professor Seidman presents a thoughtful and articulate explanation of the Supreme Court's interpretation of "predisposition" as unrelated to "criminal tendency".
44. See Russell, 411 U.S. at 443 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (prejudicial effect
criticized); Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 484 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (precursor of prejudice criticism); Comment, The Viability of the Entrapment Defense in the ConstitutionalContext, 59 IOWA L. REV. 655, 669 (1974)
(defendant's tendencies an improper yardstick); Note, The Defense of Entrapment and the Due ProcessAnalysis, 43 U. COLO. L. REV. 127, 132 (1971) (defendant's past record wrong focus).
45. See United States v. Wolffs, 594 F.2d 77, 80 (5th Cir. 1979) (some evidence of inducement must be shown); Note, The Need for a Dual Approach to
Entrapment, 59 WASH. U.L.Q. 199, 201 (1981) ("some evidence" requirement
supported).
46. See United States v. Glaeser, 550 F.2d 483 (9th Cir. 1977) (reasonable
doubt standard discussed).
47. An emphasis on predisposition "permits the introduction into evidence
of all kinds of hearsay, suspicion, and rumor-all of which would be inadmissible in any other context-in order to prove the defendant's predisposition."
Russell, 411 U.S. at 443 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See Seidman, supra note 37, at
127 (evidence of defendant's character usually inadmissible).
48. See, e.g., Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 475-76 (1948) (focus of
jury discussed). See generally Comment, Entrapment-A Due ProcessDefenseWhat Process Is Due? 11 SW. U.L. REV. 663, 688 (1979) (defendant tried on
basis of general moral character criticized).
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nal convictions, 49 criminal reputation, and rumors concerning a
defendant's criminal tendencies and associations, 50 as well as evidence that usually violates the hearsay rule,51 in order to prove predisposition. 52 The types of evidence admissible by the government
in cases of alleged entrapment then, are often prejudicial to the defendant and irrelevant to the specific crime for which a defendant is
being prosecuted.
An appropriate inquiry into a defendant's predisposition, if allowed at all, should be confined to the relevant facts of the offense
in order to avoid jury bias.53 This approach would emphasize factors such as the ongoing nature of the criminal activity and initiation of the encounter by the defendant with the government.
Otherwise, the accused is rendered defenseless against a broad inquest into his moral character, his reputation, and his associations
with individuals of questionable integrity.
The second criticism of the Court's emphasis on predisposition
is that such a focus is irrelevant to the essential purpose of the entrapment defense. 54 Courts permit the accused to claim entrapment in order to examine and prohibit objectionable police
behavior. 55 Therefore, the permissibility of such police conduct
49. See, e.g., Demos v. United States, 205 F.2d 596 (5th Cir.) (prior federal
conviction), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 873 (1953); Carlton v. United States, 198 F.2d
795 (9th Cir. 1952) (prior misdemeanor conviction).
50. Russell v. United States, 411 U.S. 442, 443 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting). See, e.g., Rocha v. United States, 401 F.2d 529 (5th Cir. 1968) (evidence that
defendant was engaged in narcotics activities held admissible where entrapment defense raised), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1103 (1969). See generally Park,
supra note 31, at 200-16, 247-62 (reputation evidence discussed).
51. See, e.g., Washington v. United States, 275 F.2d 687, 690 (5th Cir. 1960)
(hearsay admitted); United States v. Siegel, 16 F.2d 134, 137 (8th Cir. 1926)
(hearsay evidence); see supra note 47.
52. If a defendant raises the entrapment defense, the Supreme Court has
stated that the defendant "cannot complain of [a] ... searching inquiry into his
own conduct and predisposition .... " Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 451.
53. For a discussion of defense counsel's strategy in dealing with character
evidence in entrapment cases, see Tanford, Entrapment: Guidelinesfor Counsel and Courts, 13 CRIM. L. BULL. 5, 20-26 (1977). Cf. Hardy, The Traps of Entrapment, 3 AM. J. CRIM. LAW 165, 202-04 (1974) (entrapment defense should be
used as attorney's last resort).
54. In Sorrells, Justice Roberts stated that
[t]he applicable principle is that courts must be closed to the trial of a crime
instigated by the government's own agents. No other issue, no comparison
of equities as between the guilty official and the guilty defendant, has any
place in the enforcement of this overruling principle of public policy.
Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 459 (Roberts, J., concurring). See also Russell, 411 U.S. at
446 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (predisposition inquiry irrelevant); Note,. Entrapment: A Source of Continuing Confusion in the Lower Courts, 5 AM. J. TR.
ADV. 293, 303 (1981) (predisposition irrelevant).
55. The purpose of the entrapment defense "must be to prohibit unlawful
government activity in instigating crime." Russell, 411 U.S. at 442 (Powell, J.,
dissenting). See also Abramson & Linderman, supra note 25, at 149 (entrapment used to prevent improper conduct by government).
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should not depend upon the prior record or propensities of the defendant. 56 This approach not only implies different law enforcement standards for different citizens but also creates a situation of
potentially inconsistent verdicts from identical police practices. 57 A
citizen's constitutional rights to equal protection 58 and due process 59 are jeopardized whenever offensive law enforcement practices are prohibited against one citizen but permitted against
another because of police speculation or hunches concerning possible criminal tendencies. 60 More importantly, such an approach misleads law enforcement officials by suggesting that investigatory
practices are governed by the criminal record or character of the
targetted defendant and not the commands of the law. 61 If criminal
56. In his concurring opinion in Sherman, Justice Frankfurter stated:
Permissible police activity does not vary according to the particular defendant concerned; surely if two suspects have been solicited at the same time
in the same manner, one should not go to jail simply because he has been
convicted before and is said to have a criminal disposition. No more does it
vary according to the suspicions, reasonable or unreasonable, of the police
concerning the defendant's activities.
Sherman, 356 U.S. at 383 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
57. See Note, supra note 44, at 133 (inconsistent results from identical practices criticized).
58. The U.S. Constitution states: "No State shall make or enforce any law
which shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdictionthe equal protection
of the laws." U.S. CONST.amend XIV, § 1 (emphasis added). If courts are willing to convict one person based upon government conduct which would be
wholly illegal if used to convict another person, then the former is not being
treated equally. See generally Orfield, The Defense of Entrapment in Federal
Courts, 1967 DUKE L.J. 39, 56 (equal protection view of entrapment discussed);
Comment, supra note 44, at 669 (unequal protection in "subjective" entrapment
criticized).
59. The U.S. Constitution provides that: "No person shall be ... deprived
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law .... ." U.S. CONST.
amend V. (emphasis added). In Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952), the
Supreme Court stated: "It has long since ceased to be true that due process of
law is heedless of the means by which otherwise relevant and credible evidence
is obtained." Id. at 172 (emphasis added). See also Comment, supra note 44, at
661 (due process-equal protection in entrapment urged).
60. In Sorrells, Mr. Justice Roberts first articulated this concern by stating:
Whatever may be the demerits of the defendant or his previous infractions
of law these will not justify the instigation and creation of a new crime, as a
means to reach him and punish him for his past misdemeanors ....To say
that such conduct by an official of government is condoned and rendered
innocuous by the fact that the defendant had a bad reputation or had previously transgressed is wholly to disregard the reason for refusing the
processes of the court to consummate an abhorrent transaction.
Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 458-59 (Roberts, J., concurring). See also Abramson and
Linderman, supra note 25, at 154-55 (criminal background should not render
impermissible conduct legal).
61. Critics of the subjective view argue that "focusing on the defendant's
innocence or predisposition has the direct effect of making what is permissible
or impermissible police conduct depend upon the past record and propensities
of the particular defendant involved." Russell, 411 U.S. at 443 (Stewart, J., dissenting). Moreover, the subjective test means that government agents are "permitted to entrap a person with a criminal record or bad reputation, and then to
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reputation, suspicions, and associations are to play a meaningful
role in shaping law enforcement practices, then they should be confined only to providing the evidentiary basis for a proper search or
arrest warrant; they must not be used as justification for unrestricted, secret surveillance or for improper inducement of target62
ted defendants.
The second element of the subjective view of entrapment concerns the level of inducement necessary to evoke criminal conduct
by the defendant. 63 Under this second inquiry, an excessive or improper inducement may indicate that the government lured an
otherwise innocent person into criminality. 64 The Supreme Court
has remained silent regarding the type or level of inducement necessary to support the subjective view of entrapment. 65 Although
physical abuse and coercion have been held to constitute impermissible inducements, 66 other less offensive forms of persuasion have
caused the courts greater difficulty. Such inducements have included simple requests,6 7 repeated requests,68 and promises of exorbitant gain, 69 as well as appeals to sympathy, 70 past friendship, 71
prosecute him for the manufactured crime, confident that his record or reputation itself will be enough to show that he was predisposed to commit the offense
anyway." Id. at 444 (Stewart, J., dissenting). See also Abramson and Lindermari, supra note 25, at 154 ("subjective" approach misleads law enforcement
officials).
62. See infra notes 191-213 and accompanying text.
63. See generally Gershman, Entrapment, Shocked Consciences, and the
Staged Arrest, 66 MINN. L. REV. 567, 584 (1982) (inducement element discussed);
Park, supra note 31, at 200 (government inducement constitutes second
element).
64. Entrapment defense prohibits law enforcement officials from instigating a criminal act by persons "otherwise innocent in order to lure them to its
commission and to punish them." Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 448. For a discussion of
cases involving an impermissible form of inducement, see 22 A.L.R. Fed. 731,
748-50.
65. See Seidman, supra note 37, at 121 (inducement issue not adequately
addressed by courts).
66. See, e.g., Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952) (conviction reversed
due to physical abuse of defendant), cited in Russell, 411 U.S. at 431 (cited as an
example of improper conduct by police). See also United States v. Archer, 486
F.2d 670, 676-77 (1973) (physical abuse of defendants condemned).
67. See, e.g., Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427 (1963).
68. See, e.g., Sorrells, 287 U.S. 435 (1932); People v. Isaacson, 44 N.Y.2d 511,
378 N.E.2d 78, 406 N.Y.S. 2d 714 (1978).
69. E.g., United States v. Reynoso-Ulloa, 548 F.2d 1329 (9th Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 436 U.S. 926 (1978). In De Lorean, government agents offered Mr. De
Lorean approximately $60 million worth of "investments" in his financially depressed automobile company. Srodes and Fallon, supra note 6, at 14, col. 1. See
also United States v. Jannotti, 673 F.2d 578, 598-99 (2d Cir.) (size of a bribe or
inducement is a significant factor), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1106 (1982).
70. E.g., Sherman, 356 U.S. 369 (1958); Kadis v. United States, 373 F.2d 370
(1st Cir. 1966); People v. Isaacson, 44 N.Y. 2d 511, 378 N.E.2d 78, 406 N.Y.S. 2d
714 (1978).

The John Marshall Law Review

[Vol. 18:365

and past drug addiction. 72 The offensiveness of a particular inducement is primarily a function of its repetition, intensity, and setting.73 Therefore, no clear standard for measuring the propriety of
a government proferred inducement has emerged from the cases.
The difficulty in determining the permissibility of a particular
inducement is exacerbated further by its logical nexus to the defendant's personal predisposition.7 4 Proverbially, there is a little
larceny in us all. 75 Thus, subjective predisposition becomes an essential element of any inducement inquiry. If the courts continue
to equate predisposition with the defendant's willingness to commit
an offense, then courts must be prepared to scrutinize the level of
inducement necessary to produce such willingness on the part of
the defendant. For example, the issue of whether a particular inducement is exorbitant depends on whether it was beyond that
amount necessary to tempt a particular defendant. Under this
view, a trivial inducement to one defendant may be exorbitant
when offered to another defendant who is not possessed of equal
moral endurance or strength of character. Such an approach is unpredictable and will rarely serve as an accurate barometer of criminal disposition. A prospective determination of a proper
inducement becomes most difficult for law enforcement officials
when it is measured by the subjective disposition of the targetted
defendant and not by an objectively considered standard of reasonableness. In theory and practice, therefore, the "subjective" view of
entrapment poses many difficulties to courts and law enforcement
planners.
The Minority View of Entrapment: An "Objective" Test
The "objective" view of entrapment is favored by many legal
71. E.g., Sorrells, 287 U.S. 435 (1932); People v. Isaacson, 44 N.Y. 2d 511, 378
N.E.2d 78, 406 N.Y.S. 2d 714 (1978).
72. See, e.g., Sherman, 356 U.S. 369 (1958) (the government informer and
the entrapped defendant were both narcotics addicts).
73. See Dix, UndercoverInvestigationsand Police Rulemaking, 53 TEX. L.
REV. 203, 260-61 (1975) (number and duration of opportunities is key factor in
inducement inquiry); Gershman, supra note 63, at 591, 624-26 (inducement must
be fairly significant).
74. See Seidman, supra note 37, at 120-27 (predisposition-inducement nexus
discussed).
75. Human nature is frail enough at best, and requires no encouragement
in wrongdoing. If we cannot assist another and prevent him from violating
the laws of the land, we at least should abstain from any active efforts in
the way of leading him into temptation.
People v. Saunders, 38 Mich. 218, 222 (1878). See also De Feo, supra note 18, at
270 (tendencies of average men should be considered); Seidman, supra note 37,
at 118 (implies few people "have no price").
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scholars, 76 the drafters of the Model Penal Code, 77 and a persistent
minority of Supreme Court justices. 78 It is termed the objective
view because under this approach the propriety of police conduct is
determined "by the likelihood, objectively considered that it would
entrap only those ready and willing to commit crime. ' 79 Under the
objective test, courts only consider the nature of the police activity
80
involved and not the predisposition of the particular defendant.
The objective view redresses the problems of prejudice and irrelevance raised by the subjective approach. One of its more significant benefits is that under the objective view, courts focus primarily
on evidence concerning the government's conduct; the efficacy of
the defense is not controlled by evidence regarding a particular defendant's predisposition. 8 ' This approach relieves the finder of fact
of the burden of determining the defendant's predisposition prior to
any inducement offered by the government. It also allows the fact
finder to measure the propriety of a given inducement by its natural
and probable effect on an "average" individual, objectively
considered.
The objective view, however, has problems of its own. Essentially, opponents maintain that some inquiry into the defendant's
76. E.g., Abramson and Linderman, supra note 25 ("objective" test preferred over "subjective" test); Murchison, The EntrapmentDefense in Federal
Courts: Modern Developments, 47 Miss. L.J. 573 (1976) (objective approach endorsed); Comment, Entrapment: Predispositionof Defendant CrucialFactorin
Entrapment Defense, 59 CORNELL L. REV. 546 (1974) (objective approach more
appropriate).
77. The Model Penal Code has adopted the view that an inducement is illegal if it creates "a substantial risk that . . . an offense will be committed by
persons other than those who are ready to commit it." MODEL PENAL CODE,
§ 2.13(1)(b) (Proposed Draft, 1962). For a critical discussion of the effect and
basis of the Model Penal Code position, see Ranney, The EntrapmentDefenseWhat Hath the Model Penal Code Wrought?, 16 DuQ. L. REV. 157 (1977-78).
The objective approach has also been adopted by the proposed new Federal
Criminal Code. U.S. National Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal
Laws, A PROPOSED NEW FEDERAL CRIMINAL CODE § 702(2) (1971).
78. See, e.g., Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484, 491 (1976) (Powell, J.,
concurring); Hampton, 425 U.S. at 495 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Russell, 411
U.S. at 436 (Douglas, J., dissenting); Sherman, 356 U.S. at 378 (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring); Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 453 (Roberts, J., concurring).
79. Sherman, 356 U.S. at 384 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
80. E.g., Grossman v. State, 457 P.2d 226 (Alaska 1969) (courts should focus
on the conduct of the government, not the defendant); State v. Mullen, 216
N.W.2d 375 (Iowa 1974) (court focuses on conduct of government in applying
entrapment defense); People v. Turner, 390 Mich. 7, 210 N.W.2d 336 (1973) (police misconduct should be real focus of entrapment defense).
81. Russell, 411 U.S. at 446 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Frankfurter
has stated:
The crucial question, not easy of answer, to which the court must direct
itself is whether the police conduct revealed in the particular case falls below standards, to which common feelings respond, for the proper use of
governmental power.
Sherman, 356 U.S. at 382 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
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prior intent is necessary to protect society against ready and willing
criminals who plan and commit contraband offenses.8 2 Absent such
an inquiry, an "unwary criminal" could escape conviction merely
because police practices employed in a particular instance were sufficient to induce crime in an ordinary citizen. This criticism of the
objective view, however, misrepresents the purpose of law enforcement and the entrapment defense. As indicated by Sorrells and its
progeny, the proper objective of law enforcement is to detect and
prevent crime, not to create it. 8 3 The objective view serves this purpose because it allows courts to determine whether a crime has
been instigated by government agents based on the natural and
probable effect that a particular government-proffered inducement
would have on an "average" citizen. It should seemingly require
less effort by undercover agents to facilitate criminal activity by an
unwary criminal than would be required to facilitate the commission of a crime by an ordinary law-abiding citizen. The objective
view merely asserts that if police conduct exceeds the level necessary to induce criminal activity by the ordinary citizen, then the
government has moved beyond merely facilitating crime and has
entered the realm of creating crime.
The advocates of the objective view, therefore, maintain that
the most reliable indicator of improper police conduct is not an inquiry into a defendant's nebulous predisposition, but rather an objective determination of the likely effect that a challenged police
practice would have on an "average" citizen. This view tends to
favor the accused because it focuses the attention of the court pri82. The majority opinions in both Sherman and Russell relied on the observation of Judge Learned Hand:
Indeed, it would seem probable, that, if there were no reply [to the defendant's claim of inducement], it would be impossible ever to secure convictions of any offenses which consist of transactions that are carried on in
secret.
Sherman v. United States, 200 F.2d 880, 882 (2d Cir. 1957), quoted in Russell, 411
U.S. at 434, and Sherman, 356 U.S. at 377 n.7. See also Livermore, ABSCAM
Entrapment, 17 CRIM. L. BULL. 69, 72 (1981) (a defendant's capacity to resist
certain government-proferred temptations should be tested by government
agents in certain crimes).
83. The Supreme Court has repeatedly stated:
The function of law enforcement is the prevention of crime and the apprehension of criminals. Manifestly, that function does not include the manufacturing of crime. Criminal activity is such that stealth and strategy are
necessary weapons in the arsenal of the police officer. However, '[a] different question is presented when the criminal design originates with the officials of the Government, and they implant in the mind of an innocent
person the disposition to commit the alleged offense and induce its commission in order that they may prosecute.'
Russell, 411 U.S. at 434-35, quoting Sherman, 356 U.S. at 372 and Sorrells, 287
U.S. at 442. For an interesting discussion of the economic consequences of government instigated crime, see United States v. Kaminski, 703 F.2d 1004, 1010
(7th Cir. 1983) (Posner, J., concurring).
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marily on the conduct of the police and does not scrutinize the criminal associations or tendencies of the accused.
Despite their differences, both the subjective and the objective
tests of entrapment suffer from two shortcomings in coping with
sophisticated, undercover operations. First, although the Supreme
Court has never addressed the issue,8 4 a majority of lower courts
require that a defendant who claims entrapment must also admit to
having committed the crime.8 5 This poses significant problems to
the trial lawyer.8 6 Forcing the defendant to admit guilt at trial,
notwithstanding concerns that his free-will was overborne by a government inducement, further increases the risk of prejudice to the
defendant's case. 8 7 Second, and more fundamentally, the Supreme
Court has stated that the entrapment defense is a product of judicial rulemaking and is not of a constitutional dimension. 88 Therefore, the entrapment defense can be limited or altered as desired by
the courts.8 9 This renders the entrapment defense subject to the
same process of evisceration suffered by the exclusionary rule90 and
other defenses 9 ' to government misconduct. It will be shown, however, that defending against instances of offensive government undercover operations in an entrapment setting may rest on firmer
grounds than judicial rulemaking. The defense can be viewed in
84. United States v. Valencia, 645 F.2d 1158, 1172 (2d Cir. 1980). But see

Murchison, The EntrapmentDefense in FederalCourts: Modern Developments,
47 Miss. L.J. 573, 609-10 (1976) (author asserts that Sorrells Court expressly
rejected nonavailability of entrapment defense on a not-guilty plea).
85. See Annot., 61 A.L.R. 2d 677. For a discussion of the trend in the federal
courts against the "defendant must admit all" rule, see Note, Denial of the
Crime and the Availability of the EntrapmentDefense in the FederalCourts, 22
B.C.L. REV. 911, 916-29 (1981).
86. See Tanford, supra note 53, at 18-29 (litigation problems involved in "inconsistent defenses" discussed). See also Hardy, supra note 53, at 202-04 (recommendations for attorneys in entrapment cases).
87. See supra notes 44-53 and accompanying text.
88. United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 433-36 (1973).
89. Cf. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 491 (1966) ("where the rights secured by the Constitution are involved, there can be no [judicial] rule making
...which would abrogate them").
90. See United States v. Leon, 104 S. Ct. 3405, 3430 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (Exclusionary Rule suffers from "gradual but determined strangulation" by the Court). See, e.g., United States v. Leon, 104 S. Ct. 3405 (1984)
(Court recognizes "good faith" exception to Exclusionary Rule); Nix v. Williams, 104 S. Ct. 2501 (1984) (Court adopts "inevitable discovery" exception to
Exclusionary Rule); United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620 (1980) (Exclusionary
Rule inapplicable concerning evidence suggested in direct examination and introduced for impeachment purposes during cross examination); United States v.
Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974) (Court declines to apply Exclusionary Rule to
grand jury proceedings). See also Posner, Rethinking the Fourth Amendment,
1981 S. CT. REV. 49, 53-80 (economic analysis supports replacing Exclusionary
Rule with tort remedies).
91. See, e.g., New York v. Quarles, 104 S. Ct. 2626 (1984) (public safety exception to Miranda Rule). See also infra note 208 (exceptions to warrant
requirement).
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the context of a constitutional defense. 92 Such a constitutional connection between the entrapment defense and the interests affected
by overzealous law enforcement practices may explain the De
Lorean verdict and may form the basis for a defense to future cases
of government misconduct.
De Lorean's EntrapmentDefense: A Misguided Missile
While the objective view of entrapment has been adopted by
several state jurisdictions, 9 3 the Supreme Court has expressly
adopted the subjective approach in federal cases.94 Thus, in evaluating a claim of entrapment, the trier of fact in federal cases must
focus on the conduct of the defendant and not on the conduct of the
government agents. Accordingly, the De Lorean jury was instructed to focus on Mr. De Lorean's predisposition or willingness
to participate in a drug trafficking scheme when he was approached
by government undercover agents.9 5 In retrospect, however, it is
likely that the jury either misunderstood or misapplied that in92. In Sherman, the Supreme Court alluded to the constitutional dimen-

sions of entrapment practices by stating:
When the criminal design originates with the officials of the government
and they implant in the mind of the innocent person the disposition to commit the alleged offense ... stealth and strategy become as objectionablepolice methods as the coerced confession and the unlawful search.
Sherman, 356 U.S. at 372 (emphasis added). It has also been suggested that
"[e]ntrapment is due process." Ehrlich, Sorrells-Entrapmentor Due Process?
A Redefinement of the Entrapment Defense, N.Y. ST. B.J., July 1983 at 36 (author re-examines Sorrells in light of due process defense). For a general discussion of the constitutional aspects of the entrapment defense, see Magness, supra
note 18, at 127-28 (author discusses several possible constitutional bases for entrapment defense); Note, The Viability of the EntrapmentDefense in the Constitutional Context, 59 IOWA L. REV. 655, 660-70 (1974) (fifth amendment
applicable to entrapment cases). See also infra note 134 (additional articles
listed supporting constitutional defense to extreme cases of government law enforcement misconduct).
93. See supra note 80.
94. See United States v. Myers, 527 F. Supp. 1206, 1220 (E.D.N.Y. 1981) ("objective" approach never accepted by Supreme Court majority).
The majority in Russell clearly stated: "We decline to overrule these cases
[in which the Court adopted the subjective approach]. Sorrells is a precedent of
long standing that has already been reexamined in Sherman and implicitly
there reaffirmed." Russell, 411 U.S. at 433. See also Dunham, Hampton v.
United States: Last Rites for the 'Objective' Theory of Entrapment, 8-9 COLUM.
HUM. RTS. L. REV. 223 (1977) (Supreme Court has effectively precluded application of "objective" test).
95. In De Lorean, U.S. District Judge Robert Takasugi read the following
jury instruction to the jurors which describes the subjective test for
entrapment:
First, the idea for committing the acts came from the creative activity of
the government agents or informants and not from John De Lorean. Second, the government agents and informant then induced John De Lorean
into committing the acts. Third, John Z. De Lorean was not ready and willing to commit the acts before the government agents and informant induced him into becoming involved with the charged activity.
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struction in light of the evidence presented at trial concerning Mr.
De Lorean's predisposition.
Beginning in March, 1982, John De Lorean faced a serious financial crisis. 96 His De Lorean Motor Company was in a desperate
financial condition. The British government was threatening to
permanently close the company's main plant in Northern Ireland
unless De Lorean acquired $30 million in additional financing. 97 Investors were rare and the upscale De Lorean automobile market
was weak. In short, Mr. De Lorean needed to attract financial investors with significant resources or face bankruptcy. It was
against this backdrop that a shrewd, rather unsavory government
informant, 98 and former neighbor, first telephoned Mr. De Lorean
on June 29, 1982 for purportedly social reasons.
During the months following the initial conversation, a conspiracy emerged in which a substantial quantity of cocaine would be
marketed in the United States. 9 9 Through an elaborate series of
proposals and counter-proposals, Mr. De Lorean agreed to provide
an ownership interest in his motor company to undercover agents
posing as drug dealers in exchange for nearly $60 million in financial assistance for his ailing motor company. 100 The elaborate
scheme ultimately collapsed, however, because Mr. De Lorean was
in fact an unwitting participant in a bail out scheme which was conceived and organized by government undercover agents. The
money, the drugs, the dealers, and the champagne were all props in
a neatly staged sting operation. 01'
It is clear from the trial testimony of government agents that
the government first mentioned cocaine to Mr. De Lorean during
the initial unrecorded conversations 10 2 between De Lorean and the
Wilson, De Lorean's Acquittal Serves as Indictment of FederalSting, Chi. Tribune, August 19, 1984, § 1, at 3, col. 1. See also United States v. Williams, 529 F.
Supp. 1085, 1095 (E.D.N.Y.) (entrapment jury instruction given by trial court in
ABSCAM case), affd, 705 F.2d 603 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 524
(1983).
96. See Srodes & Fallon, supra note 6, at 14, col. 2.
97. See Hoover, A Trial of Images, supra note 1, at 1.
98. The government informant, James Timothy Hoffman, has been described as an admitted perjurer and cocaine smuggler who turned informer after being granted immunity from drug smuggling charges. Moreover, Mr.
Hoffman was reportedly paid over $111,643 between January, 1982 and May,
1984 by the government. Additionally, Mr. Hoffman had demanded 10% of any
assets seized in the De Lorean investigation. The De Lorean trial judge termed
Hoffman a "hired gun" for the government. N.Y. Times, August 17, 1984, at B6,
col. 4-5.
99. See Hoover, A Trial of Images, supra note 1, at 1.
100. Id.
101. See Wilson, 'Simple' Drug Case Ends Its Bizarre Run, Chi. Tribune, August 17, 1984, § 1, at 5, cols. 1-3.
102. See Tybor, Government Conduct Gets Guilty Verdict, Chi. Tribune, August 19, 1984, § 5, at 4, col. 2.
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government informant. Additionally, an undercover agent testified
03
that Mr. De Lorean had no prior background in drug trafficking.'
In fact, the government undercover agents further stated that they
proposed the details of financing the drug trafficking scheme to Mr.
De Lorean, provided the source of the narcotics, and set the
purchase price for the narcotics.' 0 4 None of these factors, however,
are determinative of the issue of predisposition. 10 5 When a person is
shown to be ready and willing to violate the law, the fact that the
opportunity to do so was provided by undercover agents is not entrapment. 0 6 Furthermore, merely because the government initiated the contact with the defendant or assisted in the commission of
a crime does not, in itself, constitute entrapment. 10 7 As previously
indicated, the traditional subjective view of entrapment focuses on
the willingness of the defendant, not the conduct of the government. Despite opportunities to extricate himself from the drug con08
spiracy, De Lorean remained committed to the illegal scheme.1
Yet, the jury acquitted him.
While the result in De Lorean may have been correct, it cannot
be supported under the traditional entrapment test as presented in
the jury instruction. 0 9 De Lorean's clear predisposition to commit
103. N.Y. Times, August 17, 1984, p. B6, Col. 4 (F.B.I. Special Agent Benjamin Tisa admitted at trial the absence of evidence that De Lorean was involved
previously in drug trafficking).
104. Tybor, supra note 102, § 5 at 4, col. 2.
105. See United States v. Fleischman, 684 F.2d 1329, 1343 (9th Cir.) (fact that
government initiated the contact with defendant not dispositive of the issue of
entrapment), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1044 (1982); United States v. Swets, 563 F.2d
989, 990 (10th Cir. 1977) (first contact not dispositive), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1022
(1978); United States v. Ratcliffe, 550 F.2d 431, 434 (9th Cir. 1976) (mere assistance of government agents in commission of crime does not constitute entrapment); United States v. Gonzalez-Benitez, 537 F.2d 1051 (9th Cir.) (government
can supply contraband to gain confidence of defendant), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
923 (1976). For a general description of tactics employed by government in the
ABSCAM investigation, see United States v. Carpentier, 689 F.2d 21 (2d Cir.
1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1108 (1983).
106. The Supreme Court has repeatedly indicated that "the fact that officers
or employees of the Government merely afford opportunities or facilities for
the commission of the offense does not defeat the prosecution." Russell, 411 U.S.
423, 435 (1973) (quoting Sherman and Sorrells).
107. See United States v. Fleischman, 684 F.2d 1329, 1343 (9th Cir. 1982);
United States v. Christopher, 488 F.2d 849 (9th Cir. 1973).
108. On September 4, 1982, in a videotaped meeting concerning financing the
narcotics deal, the following conversation transpired:
Mr. Hoffman [informant]: "I mean if you don't want to do it, if you want
to stop, you're not compelled to, I won't be
mad, I won't be hurt, I won't be anything. If
you can get the money some where else and it's
better circumstances, I'd say do it"
Mr. De Lorean:
"Well, I want to proceed."
N.Y. Times, August 17, 1984, at B6, col. 6. See also Prosecution'sEntrapment
Memorandum, supra note 2, at "exhibits" (conversation transcript).
109. See supra note 95.
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the illegal scheme would have precluded his prevailing on entrapment grounds. In order to understand the result of the De Lorean
trial then, it is necessary to look beyond the entrapment defense
and its inherent limitations. 110 Accordingly, it will be shown that
the De Lorean verdict can only be justified and explained by reference to an emerging constitutional defense to offensive government
undercover operations: the due process defense.
THE RISE AND FALL AND RESURRECTION OF THE
DUE PROCESS DEFENSE
Due process has been characterized as involving "fundamental
principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our civil
and political institutions.""' In essense, the fifth amendment due
process clause guarantees a fair trial to every defendant. 1 2 This
concept of "fundamental fairness '" 11 3 necessarily embodies notions
114
of a fair judge, a fair jury, and a fair accusatory procedure as well.
When truly outrageous government conduct is used against a defendant in the accusatory stage, the due process clause of the fifth
amendment precludes conviction of a defendant without reference
to any alleged predisposition. 115 The Supreme Court has indicated
110. Entrapment has certain identifiable limitations. First, it is not available
to the predisposed defendant. Russell, 411 U.S. at 433-36. Second, the entrapment defense is not of a constitutional dimension. Id. It remains a matter of
implied intent under statutory construction. See supra note 24. Third, entrapment remains a question of fact for the jury to decide in most cases. Sorrells,
287 U.S. at 452. Fourth, it is generally not available to a defendant who denies
committing the offense. See Annot., 61 A.L.R. 2d 677. Fifth, a defendant who is
induced by a third party not connected with the government cannot raise the
defense. United States v. Twigg, 588 F.2d 373, 376 (3d Cir. 1978).
111. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 328 (1937), overruled on other
grounds, Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 794 (1969). In effect, due process
ensures "minimum standards of fairness." Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184,
215 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (due process prohibits trying a defendant twice for same crime); Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 236 (1941) (due
process ensures fairness at all stages of criminal procedure).
112. "A fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due process." In
re Murchinson, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955). The protection provided by the fifth
amendment "is as broad as the mischief against which it seeks to guard." Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 562 (1891).
113. Kinsella v. United States ex rel Singleton, 361 U.S. 234, 246 (1960) (fundamental fairness in law enforcement mandated by fifth amendment); Lisenba
v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 236 (1941) (due process prevents fundamental unfairness from infecting a trial).
114. Lisenba, 314 U.S. at 236-38. See also B. SCHWARTZ, CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 215 (1972) (right to a fair trial "presupposes" a defendant's right to a fair
accusatory procedure as well).
115. United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 431-32 (1973) (due process principles may absolutely bar a conviction). See, e.g., Cox v. State of Louisiana, 379
U.S. 559, 569-71 (1965) (due process barred conviction of defendant under statute punishing picketing near courthouses where defendant relied on assurances
of government official); Raley v. State of Ohio, 360 U.S. 423, 437-39 (1959) (due
process barred contempt conviction of witness who refused to answer questions
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that law enforcement conduct that violates "fundamental fairness,
shocking to the universal sense of justice"'116 would provide the nec117
essary basis for dismissal of a conviction on due process grounds.
While this defense has been used effectively in several lower
courts, 118 it has received a mixed reception from the Supreme
Court in cases involving offensive government undercover law
enforcement.
The "Rise" of the Due Process Defense
In 1973, the Supreme Court was presented with a case that involved an admittedly predisposed defendant. 119 In Russell v.
United States,120 the defendant was convicted of unlawfully manufacturing and selling an illicit drug.' 21 The defendant raised two
at hearing after being assured of right to rely on privilege against self-incrimination by government official); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952) (due
process barred conviction based upon evidence forcibly removed from defendant's stomach by government agents); Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 239-41
(1941) (due process barred conviction based on unlawfully extracted confession). See infra notes 130-162 and accompanying text.
116. Kinsella v. United States, 361 U.S. 234, 246 (1960), quoted in Russell, 411
U.S. at 431-32.
117. Russell, 411 U.S. at 431-32.
118. E.g., United States v. Twigg, 588 F.2d 373 (3d Cir. 1978) (due process
barred criminal conviction because government agent planned, set up, and ran
manufacturing of illicit drugs); United States v. West, 511 F.2d 1083 (3d Cir.
1975) (due process barred criminal conviction because government agent provided the drugs); United States v. Archer, 486 F.2d 670, 676-77 (2d Cir. 1973)
(due process defense recognized but conviction reversed on other grounds);
Greene v. United States, 454 F.2d 783 (9th Cir. 1971) (due process barred conviction where government provided the materials and labor to make bootleg liquor); United States v. Batres-Santolino, 521 F. Supp. 744, 752 (N.D. Cal. 1981)
(due process barred conviction because government agent initiated defendant to
drug-related enterprise); United States v. Jannotti, 501 F. Supp. 1182 (E.D. Pa.
1980) (due process principles applied), rev'd on other grounds, 673 F.2d 578 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 2906 (1983); United States v. Hastings, 447 F. Supp.
534 (E.D. Ark. 1977) (dismissal simpliciter of indictments allowed where outrageous government conduct used in apprehending defendants); People v. Isaacson, 44 N.Y.2d 511, 378 N.E.2d 78, 406 N.Y.S.2d 714 (1978) (due process barred
conviction where government's active and insistent encouragement led to
crime). But see United States v. Ordner, 554 F.2d 24 (2d Cir.) (predisposition
outweighed significant governmental involvement in crime); cert. denied, 434
U.S. 824 (1977); Note, The Need For a Dual Approach to Entrapment, 59 WASH.
U.L.Q. 199, 207 n.58 (1981) (noting cases in which due process defense has
failed). For a discussion of due process cases, see Abramson & Linderman,
supra note 25.
119. United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 427-28 (1973). For a review of the
history of entrapment and due process defenses in the Supreme Court, see Abramson & Linderman, supra note 25, at 140-58.
120. 411 U.S. 423 (1973). For a discussion of the scope and effect of the Russell case, see Note, Recent Decisions, 12 DUQ. L. REV. 340-48 (1973); Note, Criminal Procedure: Supreme Court Attempts to Clarify Limits of Entrapment
Defense, 58 MINN. L. REV. 325 (1973).
121. Russell, 411 U.S. at 424-27 (manufacturer of Methamphetamine or
"Speed").
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defenses: entrapment and due process. During the course of the
government investigation, an undercover narcotics agent had provided the defendant with an essential ingredient which was difficult
to obtain, though legally obtainable. 122 The court of appeals reversed the defendant's conviction notwithstanding his predisposition because of "an intolerable degree of governmental
participation in the criminal enterprise.' 23 The Russell Court disagreed, however, and re-affirmed the traditional "subjective" view
of entrapment against the "objective" view advanced by four dissenting justices.
More importantly, however, the Court held open the possibility
that a predisposed defendant could claim a constitutional deprivation of due process in cases of government misconduct. In the
widely cited dicta of Justice Rehnquist, the Russell Court stated:
While we may some day be presented with a situation in which the
conduct of law enforcement agents is so outrageous that due process
principles would absolutely bar the government from invoking judia conviction ... the instant case is distinctly
cial processes to obtain
1 24
not of that breed.

Thus, Russell caused widespread speculation that the Supreme
Court was prepared to look beyond the traditional entrapment defense when outrageous government conduct produced a criminal
conviction. 125 This view became less certain, however, as a result of
122. The government agent supplied defendant with the chemical phenyl-2propanone, an essential ingredient in the manufacture of methamphetamine.
Id. at 425. The phenyl propanone was available only to licensed persons and,
thus, was difficult but not impossible to obtain elsewhere. Id. at 449 (Douglas,
J., dissenting).
123. Russell, 459 F.2d 671, 673 (1972), rev'd, 411 U.S. 423 (1973).
124. 411 U.S. at 431-32 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). Post-Russell
cases often refer to this dictum as a basis for recognizing the existence of the
due process defense. See, e.g., United States v. Corcione, 592 F.2d 111, 114-15 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 975 (1979); United States v. Twigg, 588 F.2d 373, 377
(3d Cir. 1978); United States v. Ryan, 548 F.2d 782, 788 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 939 (1976); United States v. Register, 496 F.2d 1072, 1081 (5th Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1120 (1975); United States v. Archer, 486 F.2d 670, 676 (2d
Cir. 1973).
The majority in Russell cited the example of Rochin v. California, 342 U.S.
165 (1952) as satisfying this due process standard. Russell, 411 U.S. at 431-32. In
Rochin, law enforcement agents forcibly pumped the defendant's stomach at a
hospital in order to retrieve two morphine capsules for evidence. Rochin, 342
U.S. at 166. This type of government misconduct was held violative of fifth
amendment guarantees of fundamental fairness and barred conviction of the
defendant. Id. at 172. The Russell Court's reliance on Rochin has been criticized, however, as an unnecessarily extreme example of the due process defense. Gershman, supra note 63, at 598-601.
125. See, e.g., United States v. West, 511 F.2d 1083, 1086 (3rd Cir. 1975) (court
reversed conviction based on Russell theory of intolerable government conduct
and entrapment). See also Comment, The Viability of the EntrapmentDefense
in the ConstitutionalContext, 59 IOWA L. REV. 655, 664-70 (1974) (scope of Russell's due process defense explored); Note, Entrapment, 12 DUQ. L. REV. 340,
344-45, 347 (1973) (a "new" due process defense emerges from Russell); Note,
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the Court's next and last case concerning the defense.

The "Fall" of the Due Process Defense
In 1976, the Supreme Court attempted once again to present a
definitive statement concerning a government misconduct defense. 126 In Hampton v. United States,127 a predisposed defendant
raised entrapment and due process defenses to a criminal conviction. In Hampton, the defendant was convicted of selling heroin,
supplied by a government informant, to government agents. The
defendant argued that, although his predisposition rendered the entrapment defense unavailable, the government's outrageous conduct in supplying him with the contraband denied him his due
process. A deeply divided Supreme Court affirmed Hampton's
conviction.
Justice Rehnquist, in writing the plurality opinion, renounced
the due process defense previously acknowledged in Russell 28 even
though the Court had previously applied the defense in an entrapment setting. 129 The five justices comprising the concurring and
dissenting opinions disagreed with Justice Rehnquist, however, and
expressly recognized the viabilty of a due process defense in cases
involving outrageous government conduct. 130 Since Hampton, the
CriminalProcedure: Supreme CourtAttempts to Clarify Limits of Entrapment
Defense, 58 MINN. L. REV. 325, 329 (1973) (Russell acknowledges but does not
delineate scope of due process defense).
126. Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484 (1976).
127. Id. For a critical discussion of the scope and possible effect of the
Hampton case, see Note, Entrapment, 5 N.D.L. REV. 284, 289-91 (1976).
128. In Hampton, Justice Rehnquist apparently reversed his position toward
the due process defense announced in Russell. See supra note 124 and accompanying text. Writing for a plurality of the court in Hampton, Rehnquist stated
that "[tihe remedy of the criminal defendant with respects to the acts of Government agents, which, far from being resisted, are encouraged by him, lies
solely in the defense of entrapment. But ... petitioner's conceded predisposition rendered this defense unavailable to him." 425 U.S. at 490 (emphasis added). Thus, it appears that the more conservative members of the Court had
withdrawn their support for a due process defense in an entrapment setting. In
Hampton, Justice Rehnquist was joined in his restrictive view of the due process defense by Chief Justice Burger and Mr. Justice White. Id. at 485.
129. See, e.g., Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 571 (1965) (due process barred
conviction to prevent "indefensible sort of entrapment by the State" (quoting
Raley v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 423, 438 (1959)). Accord Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S.
219, 236-37 (1941) (due process barred conviction based on improper police conduct in obtaining a coerced confession from defendant).
130. In his concurring opinion, Justice Powell, joined by Justice Blackmun,
was "unwilling to join the plurality in concluding that, no matter what the circumstances, neither due process principles nor our supervisory power could
support a bar to conviction in any case where the government is able to prove
predisposition." Hampton, 425 U.S. at 495 (Powell, J., concurring). In his dissenting opinion, Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Stewart and Marshall
would have reversed Hampton's conviction on due process grounds. Id. at 497
(Brennan, J., dissenting). The dissenting justices viewed the government's role
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Supreme Court has refused to reconsider the issue of entrapment
and due process in cases of alleged government misconduct. 131 As a
result, the due process defense has been examined and debated in
the lower courts 132 and in Congress 133 and has received considera34
ble attention from legal scholars.
in instigating the crime and providing the contraband as violative of fundamental fairness guaranteed by the due process defense. Id. at 497-500 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting). For a discussion of post-Hampton cases that have reversed a conviction on due process grounds, see Abramson & Linderman, Entrapment and
Due Process, supra note 107, at 158-82.
131. For cases concerning the entrapment or due process defense that have
been denied certiorariby the Supreme Court, see United States v. Jannotti, 501
F. Supp. 1182 (E.D. Pa. 1980), rev'd on other grounds, 673 F.2d 578 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 102 S. Ct. 2906 (1982); United States v. Till, 609 F.2d 228 (5th Cir.) (due
process defense unsuccessful where government merely purchased drugs from
defendant), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 995 (1980); United States v. Corcione, 592 F.2d
111 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 985 (1979); United States v. Thomas, 567 F.2d
638 (5th Cir.), cert. denied 439 U.S. 822 (1978); United States v. Johnson, 565
F.2d 179 (1st Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1075 (1978); United States v. Leja,
563 F.2d 244 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1074 (1978); United States v.
Graves, 556 F.2d 1319 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 923 (1978); United
States v. Reynoso-Ulloa, 548 F.2d 1329 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 926
(1978). See also supra note 9.
132. For lower court cases which have successfully applied the due process
defense in an entrapment setting, see United States v. Twigg, 588 F.2d 373 (3d
Cir. 1978); United States v. West, 511 F.2d 1083 (3d Cir. 1975); Greene v. United
States, 454 F.2d 783 (9th Cir. 1971); United States v. Batres-Santolino, 521 F.
Supp. 744 (N.D. Cal. 1981); United States v. Jannotti, 501 F. Supp. 1182 (E.D. Pa.
1980), rev'd on other grounds, 673 F.2d 578 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 2906
(1982); United States v. Hastings, 447 F. Supp. 534 (E.D. Ark. 1977); People v.
Isaacson, 44 N.Y.2d 511, 378 N.E.2d 78, 406 N.Y.S.2d 714 (1978). See also Moloy,
ABSCAM: Time for the Supreme Court to Clarify the Due Process Defense, 16
IND. L. REV. 581, 586-91 (1983) (lower courts attempt to clarify due process
defense).
133. In Russell, the Court stated that "Congress may address itself to the
question and adopt any substantive definition of the [entrapment] defense that
it may find desirable." Russell, 411 U.S. at 433. Several attempts to enact a
statutory entrapment defense have failed. See, e.g., S.1, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., § 13B2 (1973) (entrapment statute); S.1, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 551 (1976) (entrapment statute).
134. See, e.g., Abramson & Linderman, supra note 25 (due process explained
and supported); Moloy, supra note 132 (due process defense supported); Murchison, supra note 76 (traces rise of due process defense); O'Connor, Entrapment Versus Due Process: A Solution to the Problem of the Criminal
Conviction Obtained by Law Enforcement Misconduct, 7 FORDHAM URBAN L.J.
35 (1978) (due process supported); Comment, The Viability of the Entrapment
Defense in the ConstitutionalContext, 59 IOWA L. REV. 655 (1974) (development
of due process defense); Comment, Entrapment-A Due Process DefenseWhat Process Is Due?, 11 Sw. U. L. REV. 663 (1979) (excellent discussion of due
process defense); Note, Entrapment: A Source of Continuing Confusion in the
Lower Courts, 5 AM. J. TR. ADV. 293, 302-08 (1983) (due process defense supported); Note, The Need For a Dual Approach to Entrapment, 59 Wash. U.L.Q.
199 (1982) (excellent article applying due process principles to entrapment).
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The "Resurrection"of the Due Process Defense
The due process or "outrageous government conduct" defense
that is emerging from the lower courts differs significantly from the
traditional entrapment defense. First, the due process defense is
based on the fundamental fairness requirement of the fifth amendment and raises a question of law for the judge to decide. 135 Second,
it is generally available even to a defendant who was admittedly
predisposed to commit the crime and, therefore, could not claim entrapment. 136 Third, a defendant who was induced by a third party
not connected with the government is not barred from raising the
due process defense. 137 Fourth, the defense remains available to a
defendant who denies committing the offense. 138 Finally, the level
of government overinvolvement that must be shown by the defendant claiming a due process violation is considerably higher than that
required for the entrapment defense. 139 Therefore, the due process
defense constitutes an effective limitation on the extent to which
the government can become enmeshed in criminal activity in order
to prosecute an individual, without reference to predisposition.
Three leading due process defense cases illustrate the efficacy
of this defense in controlling offensive undercover "sting" operations. In United States v. Twigg,140 the defendants were convicted
135. Compare Hampton, 425 U.S. at 494 n.6 (due process defense a constitutional defense for judge to decide) (Powell, J., concurring), and Russell, 411 U.S.
at 432 (same), and United States v. Twigg, 588 F.2d 373, 379 (1978) (same), and
Abramson & Linderman, supra note 25, at 154 (due process defense a question
of law) with Russell, 411 U.S. at 433 (entrapment not a constitutional defense),
and Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 452 (entrapment is generally a question of fact for jury
to decide).
136. Compare Russell, 411 U.S. at 450 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (would hold
defendant entrapped, despite predisposition) and Greene v. United States, 454
F.2d 783, 786-87 (9th Cir. 1971) (due process defense bars prosecution of predisposed defendants) with Russell, 411 U.S. at 433 (entrapment not available to a
predisposed defendant).
137. See Twigg, 588 F.2d at 377 (discussing the difference between entrapment and due process defenses concerning defendants induced by a third party
not connected with the government).
138. Compare Twigg, 588 F.2d at 377, with Annot., 61 A.L.R. 2d 677 (entrapment generally not available to the defendant who denies committing the offense). But see Comment, Denial of the Crime and the Availability of the
Entrapment Defense in the Federal Courts, 22 B.C.L. REV. 911 (1981) (trends
towards availability of entrapment defense in cases of government misconduct).
139. United States v. Ramirez, 710 F.2d 535, 541 (9th Cir. 1983); United States
v. Jannotti, 673 F.2d 578, 607 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 2906 (1982).
140. 588 F.2d 373 (3d Cir. 1978). For articles discussing the Twigg case at
length, see Gershman, supra note 63, at 607-08; Moloy, supra note 132, at 588-89;
Note, Due Process Defense When Government Agents Instigate and Abet
Crime, 67 GEO. L. J. 1455 (1979) (Twigg casenote).
In Twigg, the defendants were convicted essentially for manufacturing and
conspiring to traffic methamphetamine, or "speed". A government informant
had contacted one of the defendants to seek his involvement in setting up a
"speed" factory. Both defendants agreed to participate. While one of the de-
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of manufacturing and conspiring to sell a controlled substance. In
reversing the conviction, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
stated that predisposition was not controlling in cases involving the
due process defense. 1 4 ' The court noted that the defendants had
not been involved in an ongoing criminal activity and that the illegal plan had originated with the government. 142 The court also
stated that, absent the government's assistance, the defendants
lacked the capacity to commit the offense. 1 43 Moreover, defendantTwigg "contributed nothing in terms of expertise, money, supplies
or ideas" to the criminal enterprise. 4 4 Accordingly, the Twigg
court applied a totality of the circumstances test and dismissed the
convictions due to government overinvolvement in all essential
145
stages of the crime.

The Twigg case typifies a factual setting that demands a due
process defense. Predisposition and other factors had barred the
defendants in Twigg from raising the defense of entrapment. 146
The police misconduct was patently outrageous, however, and the
conviction could not stand. The court's only option was the due
process defense.' 47 The level of government overinvolvement in
the criminal activity in Twigg unquestionably exceeded that of
either Russell or Hampton and necessitated dismissal. In Twigg,
the government not only originated the intent to manufacture and
sell the illicit drug, but it also effectively controlled the operation
from start to finish. 148 The Twigg court, therefore, properly reversed the defendant's conviction notwithstanding the predisposition limitation inherent in the entrapment defense.
A second case, People v. Isaacson,'49 illustrates an appropriate
fendants was responsible for financing and distributing the "speed", the government's involvement was far more substantial. The government provided its
informant with the essential chemical ingredient, the balance of the necessary
chemicals, all expertise and the "factory" facility itself. Furthermore, the informant took complete charge of the factory operation. See id. at 375-76. In
reversing the defendant's conviction, the Twigg court noted that predisposition
was not controlling in cases involving the due process defense. The circuit court
emphasized that the illegal plan originated with the government and that the
defendants had not been involved in any ongoing criminal activity. Id. at 382.
141. Twigg, 588 F.2d at 378-79.
142. Id. at 381-82.
143. Id. at 381.
144. Id. at 382.
145. Id. at 381-82.
146. Id. at 376.
147. Id. at 380-82.
148. Id. See also United States v. Gonzales, 539 F.2d 1238, 1240 (9th Cir. 1976)
(due process violated only if government directs criminal enterprise from start
to finish).
149. 44 N.Y.2d 511, 378 N.E.2d 78, 406 N.Y.S.2d 714 (1978). For a more complete discussion of Isaacson, see Gershman, supra note 63, at 605-06; Moloy,
supra note 132, at 590-91; O'Connor, supra note 134, at 45-53.
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application of the due process defense by a prominent state court.
In Isaacson, the New York Court of Appeals confronted a situation
where a predisposed defendant was convicted as a result of police
misconduct. In this instance, the New York state police physically
abused, threatened, and deceived a drug user in order to gain his
cooperation as an undercover informant. 150 Consequently, the informant desperately sought to persuade the defendant to sell him
illicit drugs in New York. In reversing the defendant's conviction,
New York's highest court reasoned that "the police conduct, when
tested by due process standards, was so egregious and deprivative as
to impose upon [the court] an obligation to dismiss.'' 1
Moreover,
the Isaacson court concluded that the sole motivation of the government was the desire to obtain a conviction and not to prevent fur1 52
ther crime or to protect the public.
Rather than simply reversing defendant's conviction on due
process grounds, however, the Isaacson court fashioned four factors
that should be considered in determining whether police misconduct violates the fifth amendment. These factors are: (1) whether
the government manufactured the crime which otherwise would
not have occurred, or merely involved itself in an ongoing criminal
activity; (2) whether the government agents themselves engaged in
criminal or otherwise improper conduct; (3) whether the government overcame defendant's reluctance to commit the crime with
appeals to sympathy, past friendship, exorbitant gain, or with persistent solicitations in the face of defendant's unwillingness; and
(4) whether the government had a legitimate motive for conducting
the investigation. 1 53 Under the Isaacson test, no single factor is dispositive, and a totality of the circumstances approach is applied in
determining whether to reverse a defendant's conviction.
Isaacson is another example of a modern court attempting to
condemn an offensive government operation without the benefit of
the traditional entrapment defense. Undoubtedly, the police misconduct in Isaacson, like the misconduct in Twigg, exceeded the
level of government misconduct in either Russell or Hampton. In
an effort to effectively harness the elusive standards of the fifth
amendment,15 4 the Isaacson court articulated four identifiable fac150. 44 N.Y.2d at 514-17, 378 N.E.2d at 79-80, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 715-16.
151. Id. at 518-19, 378 N.E.2d at 81, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 717.
152. Id. at 522-23, 378 N.E.2d at 84, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 720.
153. Id. at 521, 378 N.E.2d at 83, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 719. See O'Connor, supra
note 134, at 45-53 (discussing Isaacson test).
154. The Isaacsoncourt supported the application of the due process defense
by stating:
There may be those who fear that dismissal of convictions on due process
grounds may portend an unmanageable subjectivity. Such apprehension is
unjustified for courts by their very nature are constantly called upon to
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tors to consider in resolving due process cases. Furthermore, Isaacson reinforces the view that the due process defense has survived
the attempted repudiation by Hampton and may be successfully
used as a new defense for combatting offensive law enforcement
practices. The question, however, is whether the Supreme Court
155
will ultimately adopt the Isaacson test in future cases.
Finally, the due process defense was effectively applied in a
drug trafficking case remarkably similar to De Lorean. In United
States v. Batres-Santolino,l5 6 the defendants were indicted, as a result of a government undercover sting operation, for conspiracy to
import cocaine and for conspiracy to possess cocaine with the intent
to distribute it. As in De Lorean, the defendants in this instance
had never imported cocaine before and had no independent foreign
supply source of their own. 157 The federal district court dismissed
the indictment as a matter of law based on the due process defense.' 58 In so doing, the court emphasized that the government had
supplied all the drugs to the defendants. 159 Moreover, the defendants had not been involved in a drug-related enterprise until the
government undercover agents came on the scene. 160 The BatresSantolino court also noted that, although the defendants had some
culpability, 16 1 they had not embarked nor were they about to embark on any criminal activity until the government agents set into
motion the criminal operation. 1 62 Therefore, the conduct of the government in Batres-Santolino violated fundamental fairness and the
conviction was barred by the due process guarantees of the fifth
amendment.
De Lorean and the Due Process Connection
It is clear that Twigg, Isaacson, and Batres-Santolino provide a
more satisfactory explanation of the De Lorean verdict than a traditional entrapment analysis. Although De Lorean must bear some
culpability, he was not involved in any criminal enterprise until the
government agents set into motion the drug trafficking operamake judgments and, though differences of opinion often surround
institutions, this is the nature of the judicial process.
44 N.Y.2d at 524-25, 378 N.E.2d at 85, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 721.
155. See O'Connor, supra note 134, at 51-53 (recommends that
Court adopt Isaacson test).
156. 521 F. Supp. 744 (N.D. Cal. 1981).
157. Id. at 751.
158. Id. at 753.
159. Id. at 752.
160. Id. The Batres-Santolino court emphasized that almost all
which have rejected a due process defense involve defendants who
gaged in an ongoing criminal enterprise. Id. at 751 n.6.
161. Id. at 752.
162. Id.
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tion. 163 The government agents admitted in De Lorean that they
initiated, financed, and managed the trafficking operation. 6 4 De
Lorean possessed neither the expertise nor the connections necessary to import cocaine. The trier of fact in De Lorean, like that in
Batres-Santolino,likely concluded that under the circumstances it
was inconceivable that the accused would have entered the world of
international drug smuggling on his own. 165 Unlike Russell and
Hampton, De Lorean did not involve the infiltration of an ongoing
criminal enterprise by government undercover agents. Moreover,
the $60 million "investment" offered to De Lorean by the government went far beyond the "reasonable inducement"'166 that courts
have held appropriate in undercover law enforcement operations.
Finally, the De Lorean sting operation was not designed to ferret
out existing criminal activity in the interest of the public, but rather
it was designed to place an individual in the business of crime for
the first time in order to facilitate a prosecution.
In short, the level of government instigation and overinvolvement in the criminal activity in De Lorean likely shocked the jury's
sense of justice and contributed significantly to the acquittal. The
traditional entrapment defense, with its focus on predisposition,
simply was not an appropriate remedy in this instance. Indeed, the
post-trial comments of the De Lorean jurors confirm that the conduct of the government, not the conduct of the defendant, was on
trial in the De Lorean case. 167 Notwithstanding De Lorean's culpa163. See supra notes 102-04. The fact that a defendant, in an entrapment or
due process case, is a first time offender and regularly employed may indicate
that he or she is not inclined towards crime. See United States v. West, 511 F.2d
1083, 1086 (3d Cir. 1975).
164. See supra notes 102-04 and accompanying text. For cases in which
courts have condemned the government over-involvement in criminal activity,
see Twigg, 588 F.2d at 379-81; West, 511 F.2d at 1085; Greene v. United States,
454 F.2d 783, 787 (9th Cir. 1971).
165. See Bates-Santolino, 521 F. Supp. at 748, 751-52. See also United States v.
Lomas, 706 F.2d 886, 891 (9th Cir. 1983) (defendant's capacity to commit the
crime independent of the government a factor in determining government
overreaching).
166. See United States v. Kaminski, 703 F.2d 1004, 1009 (7th Cir. 1983) (inducement must be "reasonable"); United States v. Jannotti, 673 F.2d 578, 598-99
(2d Cir.) (size of inducement in relation to defendant's station in life may be a
relevant factor), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1106 (1982). See supra notes 63-75 and
accompanying text.
167. On Thursday, August 16, 1984, 8 of the 12 jurors who acquitted De
Lorean appeared before the press to explain their verdict. Prov. J., August 17,
1984, at A-6, col. 1. The jurors were identified by numbers assigned to them
during the selection process and stated as follows:
No. 36 -"If not for entrapment, there would have been a hung jury."
No. 81 -"The government's conduct was offensive."
No. 140 -"The way the government agents operated in this case was not
appropriate."
Id. (emphasis added). These comments show that jurors focused on the conduct
of the government and not on the conduct of the defendant. As Alan Dersho-
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bility, the jury properly acquitted him in a defensible reaction to
offensive undercover law enforcement practices.
While due process principles may explain the De Lorean verdict, they do not adequately explain the particular interests actually
affected by De Lorean-type undercover operations. As previously
indicated, the due process defense is triggered only by instances of
outrageous government conduct shocking to the universal sense of
justice. 168 Yet, it is not clear why the level of government misconduct need acquire outrageous proportions before the Constitution
can intervene on behalf of an aggrieved citizen. The Constitution
should be equally offended by undercover police activities of a
highly intrusive nature with respect to defendants, like De Lorean,
who are not themselves obvious targets of criminal investigation.
Implicit in an entrapment or due process defense is a recognition of
every citizen's right to be free from being harassed, targetted, or
induced into crime by the government. 1 69 This right is at the core
of an individual's basic concern for the privacies of life. Therefore,
any analysis of the interests affected by offensive government undercover operations must include a discussion of the constitutional
1 70
guarantees of the right of privacy.
THE UNDERCOVER OPERATION AND THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY

It is well established that the individual's right of privacy is a
fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution. 1 7 1 Nearly 100
years ago, the Supreme Court stated that the protection of the
fourth amendment applies "to all invasions on the part of the govwitz of Harvard Law School stated, "De Lorean's guilt or innocence played no
role in this. All the attention was focused on the government, and he was
presented as a victim." N.Y. Times, August 17, 1984, at B6, col. 2. See also
Tybor, supra note 102.
168. United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 432 (1973) (quoting Kinsella v.
United States ex rel. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234 (1960)).
169. Note, Entrapment: A Source of Continuing Confusion in the Lower
Courts, 5 AMER. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 293, 303 (1981) (a fundamental right not to be
harrassed discussed); see also Dix, Undercover Investigations and Police
Rulemaking, 53 TEX. L. REV. 203, 216-21 (1975) (right to be free from undercover surveillance discussed).
170. See Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. 323, 343-44 (1966) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting) (entrapment implicates privacy principles); Wolf v. Colorado, 338
U.S. 25, 28-29 (1949) (arbitrary intrusion by the police constitutes invasion of
privacy), overruled in part, Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961). See also, Dix,
supra note 169, at 211-212 (discussion of privacy interests affected by entrapment cases); Marx, supra note 9 (examples of undercover operations that
threaten privacy interests).
171. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (privacy constitutes a fundamental right implicit in Constitution); see also Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
347 (1967) (personal right of privacy available in government surveillance
cases); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886) (early case emphasizing importance of individual's privacy right against government intrusion).
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ernment and its employees of the sanctity of a man's home and the
privacies of life.' 72 While the parameters of the right of privacy
remain unsettled, 17 3 the defendant's privacy expectations are often
at issue in cases of offensive law enforcement practices. 174 Admittedly, privacy law is a broad and expanding area of constitutional
law. The following discussion of privacy, therefore, focuses on the
interplay of this fundamental right with the growing use of government undercover operations that often include electronic surveillance, paid informants, government-supplied contraband, and
significant intrusion into the private lives of citizens. This discussion will show that the right of privacy is a fundamental interest
protected by the entrapment and due process defenses and should
be employed to impose a standard of reasonableness upon the exer175
cise of discretion by government law enforcement agents.
The Rise of a Constitutional Theory of Privacy

The right of privacy has been termed the "basis of individuality"' 76 and the "right to be let alone.' 77 While the United States
Constitution does not explicitly mention the right of privacy, the
Supreme Court has declared that privacy is a fundamental right implicitly guaranteed by the constitutional scheme under which we
live.178 The constitutional right of privacy has been described by
172. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886).
173. See Ashdown, The FourthAmendment and the "LegitimateExpectation
of Privacy," 34 VAND. L. REV. 1289 (1981); Posner, The Uncertain Protectionof
Privacy by the Supreme Court, 1979 Sup. CT. REV. 173, 197-216; see also Keisling,
The Case Against Privacy, STUDENT LAW., September 1984, at 25 (evidence suggests that Americans desire less privacy).
174. See, e.g., Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649 (1980) (pornographic films

protected by fourth amendment against warrantless seizure by federal agents);
United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977) (footlocker protected by fourth
amendment from unreasonable search); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752
(1969) (limiting scope of search pursuant to a lawful arrest); Alderman v.
United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969) (governmental intrusion into one's home via
electronic surveillance by police limited); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347
(1967) (judicial authorization is a required antecedent to electronic surveillance); Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217 (1960) (police searches for evidence of
crime present situations demanding greatest protection of individual's privacy).
175. See infra notes 211-12.
176. R. CLARK, CRIME IN AMERICA 287 (1970), quoted in United States v.

White, 401 U.S. 745, 763 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Note, Toward a Constitutional Theory of Individuality: The Privacy Opinions of Justice Douglas, 87
YALE L.J. 1579, 1588-1600 (1978).
177. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350 (1967); Olmstead v. United
States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). See also Warren &
Brandeis, The Right of Privacy,4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890). For a discussion of
the various definitions of the right of privacy, see Gerety, Redefining Privacy,
12 HARV. C.R.-C.L.L. REV. 233, 233-246 (1977) (history and descriptions of privacy right discussed).
178. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (right of privacy is a fundamental
right guaranteed implicitly by Constitution); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 439
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the Court simply as "the right to be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion"' 179 in one's private papers, 8 0 dwellings,' 8 ' conversations,18 2 as well as decision making, 8 3 bodily integrity, 84 and
mental processes. 8 5 According to Justice Brandeis, the purpose of
the privacy right is to prevent "every unjustifiable intrusion by the
government upon the privacy of the individual.' 81 6 Therefore, in
order to ensure adherence to constitutional safeguards, courts
should carefully scrutinize a government undercover operation that
intrudes into the private life of a targetted individual.
In search and seizure cases, privacy interests are most often
(1972) (right of privacy constitutes fundamental right); Stanley v. Georgia, 394
U.S. 557 (1969) (right to be free from governmental intrusion constitutes fundamental right); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (privacy constitutes
a fundamental right implicitly guaranteed by Constitution).
179. See Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961). See also Berger
v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 53 (1967) (Court discusses intrusion principle).
180. U.S. CONST. amend. IV ("papers" protected). See, e.g., Gouled v. United
States, 255 U.S. 298, 305 (1921) (search for and seizure of private papers without
a warrant violates fourth amendment).
181. U.S. CONST. amend. IV ("houses" protected). See, e.g., Payton v. New
York, 445 U.S. 573, 585 (1980) (house); G.M. Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429
U.S. 338 (1977) (office); United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48 (1951) (hotel room).
182. See, e.g., Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969) (oral statements
protected against unreasonable search and seizure under fourth amendment);
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352-53 (1967) (fourth amendment protects a
person's private conversations as well as his private premises); Berger v. New
York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967) (conversations within unreasonable search and seizure
restrictions of fourth amendment); Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505,
511-12 (1961) (illegally seized conversations are excludable from criminal trial).
But see United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971) (plurality) (otherwise private
conversations not protected if government agent consents to carry electronic
recording device). For a critical discussion of White, see infra note 209.
183. See, e.g., Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599-600 (1977) (privacy interest in
making certain fundamental decisions protected); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973) (privacy interest in making certain family-related decisions protected).
184. U.S. CONST. amend. IV ("persons" protected). See, e.g., Schmerber v.
California, 384 U.S. 757, 767-70 (1966) (absent emergency, integrity of an individual's person cannot be violated on the mere chance that desired evidence might
be found); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952) (stomach pumping to secure
evidence not permitted). See also Gerety, supra note 177, at 266 (the body constitutes "the most basic vehicle of selfhood").
185. See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565-66 (1969) (Constitution prohibits government intrusion into one's mental processes); Davis v. Mississippi, 394
U.S. 721, 727 (1969) (probing into an individual's private life and thoughts marks
an interrogation or a search). See also Groot, The Serpent Beguiled Me And I
(Without Scienter) Did Eat-Denial Of Crime And The Entrapment Defense,
1973 LAW F. 254, 274-76 ("psychic privacy" principle prohibits government from
intruding upon a citizen's mental state in order to stimulate criminal conduct).
186. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). See also Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949) (fourth amendment protects the "security of one's privacy against arbitrary intrusion by the police"),
overruled in part, Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961).
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treated as arising out of the fourth and fifth amendments. 187 Both
amendments have been recognized as relating to the personal security of the individual.' 8 8 The Supreme Court has indicated that
"the 'unreasonable searches and seizures' condemned in the fourth
amendment are almost always made for the purpose of compelling
a man to give evidence against himself, which in criminal cases is
condemned by the fifth amendment."' 1 9 In short, an unwarranted
intrusion by government agents violates the fourth amendment,
and the use of the evidence derived therefrom violates the fifth
amendment.' 90 Thus, the fifth amendment provides the backbone
of not only the due process defense, but the privacy defense as well.
Privacy and the Government Misconduct Defenses
In the entrapment and due process defenses, the government is
prevented from convicting a defendant because of its own instigation and illegal conduct in the criminal activity. Government law
enforcement misconduct, termed "dirty business"'191 by Justice
Holmes, is not confined to instances of entrapment or outrageous
government misconduct. It pervades notions of the right of privacy
as well. The same "dirty business" that invokes the entrapment
and due process defenses in cases of government instigated crime is
present in privacy cases as well. 19 2 A case in which the government
selects an "otherwise innocent" individual, induces the individual to
commit an offense, surrounds him with contraband and government agents, and then selectively records key stages of the crime is
as much a violation of privacy as it is a violation of due process or
entrapment principles.
As stated by Justice Douglas, "[e]ntrapment is merely a facet of
a much broader problem [and] [tjogether with illegal searches and
seizures, coerced confessions, wiretapping and bugging, it repre187. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351-53 (1967); Boyd v. United States,

116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886) (fourth and fifth amendments running "almost into
each other").
188. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 633 (1886).
189. Id.
190. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 478-79 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). See Wingo, Rewriting Mapp and Miranda:A PreferenceFor Due Process,31 U. KAN. L. REV.
219, 239-45 (1983) (fifth amendment, and not Exclusionary Rule, should bar evidence seized in violation of fourth amendment); Note, Due Process Privacy and
the Path of Progress,1979 LAW F. 469 (1979) (discussing overlap of fourth and
fifth amendments).
191. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 470 (Holmes, J., dissenting) (referring to wiretapping and other undercover police practices).
192. Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. 323, 343-44 (1966) (Douglas, J., dissenting). See Dix, supra note 169 at 293-94 (fourth amendment implicated by government undercover operations); Groot, supra note 185, at 951 (government
induced crime violates fourth amendment).
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sents lawless invasion of privacy."' 193 Theories of entrapment, due
process and privacy are all aimed at displacing the notion that the
end justifies the means in law enforcement practices. 194 The defense of entrapment prevents the government from instigating a
crime by implanting a criminal design in the mind of an otherwise
innocent individual, 195 the due process defense serves to ensure
fundamental fairness in the administration of justice,'9 6 and the
right of privacy protects the citizen's right to be let alone.' 9 7 All
three defenses are concerned with prohibiting government from
improperly intruding into the lives of innocent people. Therefore,
the individual's privacy interests become a necessary consideration
in cases of entrapment and outrageous government misconduct.
The defendant's privacy expectations become especially important in cases where the government undercover operation relies on
extensive and calculated use of such law enforcement techniques as

paid informants, 198 government supplied contraband, 199 and elec193. Osborn, 385 U.S. at 343-44 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
194. Id. at 344 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
195. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
196. See supra notes 111-17 and accompanying text.

197. See supra note 177 and accompanying text. In determining the propriety of government conduct, modern courts focus on the individual's "justifiable," "legitimate," or "reasonable" expectations of privacy as the cornerstone
of the interest protected. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979). See generally Ashdown, The Fourth Amendment and the Legitimate Expectation of
Privacy, 34 VAND. L. REV. 1289 (1981) (discusses cases employing "expectation"
test); O'Brien, Reasonable Expectations of Privacy: Principlesand Policies of
Fourth Amendment Protected Privacy, 13 NEW ENG. L. REV. 662 (1978) (overview of "expectation" approach to privacy). The "reasonable expectation of privacy" test depends on two inquiries. Smith, 442 U.S. at 740. First, the Court
asks whether the individual has exhibited an actual or subjective expectation of
privacy by his conduct. Id. Under Katz, the Court considers whether the individual has shown that "he seeks to preserve [that which has been intruded
upon] as private." Katz, 389 U.S. at 351. Second, the Court asks whether the
individual's subjective expectation of privacy is one that society is prepared to
recognize as "reasonable" or "justifiable" under the circumstances. Under
Katz, the individual's expectation, viewed objectively, must be "justifiable." Id.
at 353. Thus, the individual's interest is weighed against the interest of society.
This approach necessarily requires a case by case analysis to determine the reasonableness of an individual's claim to privacy. The problem, therefore, is that
this formula becomes subject to judicial manipulation and renders prospective
determinations of one's privacy interest nearly impossible. See Ashdown,
supra, at 1310.
The "reasonable expectation of privacy" test has understandably produced
mixed results. See Ashdown, supra, at 1303-10. It appears that the individual's
expectation of privacy extends to whatever objects or situations a majority of

the Supreme Court is willing to accept as "reasonable." Consequently, this approach to privacy has been criticized as too narrow and inconsistent with Court
precedents in this area. See Ashdown, supra at 1302-10.
198. The use of governmental undercover informants raises several practical
and moral considerations. As a practical matter, courts are loathe to vest with
credibility information supplied by an informant absent some indicia of reliability. See, e.g., Illinois v. Gates, 103 S. Ct. 2317 (1983) (totality of circumstances
must be considered in addition to informant's conclusionary information). Un-
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tronic surveillance. 200 Privacy interests are particularly vulnerable
to the indiscriminate use of recording devices. Recording practices
can be used in such a manner as to manipulate the defendant's actual role in the criminal activity. 201 A well prepared undercover
derstandably, information or testimony provided by a government informant
that is based upon rumor, speculation, or spite lacks the requisite trustworthiness necessary for developing a proper factual predicate sufficient to support a
criminal proceeding. See Fletcher v. United States, 158 F.2d 321 (D.C. Cir. 1946)
(court must warn jury concerning credibility of informant witness). One practice which federal courts have rejected as inherently unreliable is the use of
government informants on a contingent fee basis. See, e.g., Williamson v.
United States, 311 F.2d 411 (5th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 950 (1965);
United States v. Curry, 284 F. Supp. 458 (N.D. Ill. 1968). Absent compelling
justification by the government, a contingent fee informant's vested interest in
generating an arrest may give license to a variety of unwarranted provocations
which serve to instigate rather than investigate crime. See United States v.
Silva, 180 F. Supp. 557, 559 (S.D.N.Y. 1959) (discusses instigation dangers inherent in use of compensated informant). Similarly, informants who are either
paid substantial sums of money or are cooperating in order to obtain government immunity from a pending prosecution also have a significant vested interest in the successful prosecution of the targetted individual. See United States
v. Jones, 362 F. Supp. 114, 116-17 (E.D. Pa. 1973) (informant's testimony discredited due to vested interest in outcome of case). Greed and self-preservation are
unhealthy motivations for an informant with demonstrated criminal tendencies
and tend to color the conduct of the undercover operation. Finally, significant
moral considerations are generated by a criminal justice system that must rely
upon the "Judas syndrome" in order to combat crime. See Sarasota HeraldTribune, November 26, 1983, at 4-C (article in which attorney J. Tony Serra
refers to use of informants as the "Judas Syndrome"). While the practice of
employing an undercover "Judas" in limited circumstances may be necessary to
infiltrate certain criminal operations, it is a practice which any free society
should not embrace without some sense of repulsion. See generally Donnelly,
JudicialControl of Informants, Spies, Stool Pigeons, and Agents Provocateurs,
60 YALE L.J. 1091 (1951) (indiscriminate use of government informants
criticized).
199. Government-supplied contraband in undercover operations also raises
significant problems concerning the reliability of the circumstances giving rise
to a criminal prosecution. Although the use of government-supplied contraband has been upheld by a divided Supreme Court, Hampton, 425 U.S. 484
(1976) (plurality), it nevertheless should be scrutinized carefully in order to determine whether the government may have in fact manufactured a given crime.
See United States v. Dilet, 265 F. Supp. 980, 986 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (criticizes practice of government-supplied contraband). Moreover, the practice of government-supplied contraband also impinges upon privacy interests inasmuch as it
injects an element of criminality into the life of an individual who might otherwise never have been exposed to contraband if let alone.
200. The use of electronic surveillance by the government imposes a heavy
responsibility on courts in their supervision of procedural fairness. Berger v.
New York, 388 U.S. 41, 56 (1967). In Berger, the court invalidated New York's
electronic eavesdropping law and warned that the "indiscriminate use of [electronic recording] devices in law enforcement raises grave constitutional questions under the fourth and fifth amendments." Id. at 62, quoting Lopez v.
United States, 373 U.S. 427, 441 (1963). See infra note 209 (consensual recording
devices discussed).
201. Id. at 344-54 (Douglas, J., dissenting). See Hodges, Electronic Visual
Surveillance and the Fourth Amendment: The Arrival of Big Brother, 3 HAST.
CONST. L.Q. 261 (1976); Comment, ElectronicSurveillance: The New Standards,
35 BROOK L. REV. 49 (1968).
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agent can carefully stage his encounters or conversations with a suspect to create a false impression of eager criminality on the part of
the suspect. Similarly, a selective use of bugging and videotaping
can effectively avoid the recording of encounters which are nonincriminating and counter-productive to the government's case.
This effect is often achieved by the simple practice of not recording
the initial contact with the suspect in which the instigation and inducement of the criminal activity occur. This omission by the government conveniently renders any determination of government
instigation difficult, if not impossible. Moreover, recorded materials may be altered with little difficulty in order to create a desired
result. 20 2 Many of these abuses would be redressed simply by subjecting the prospective use of electronic surveillance in a planned
undercover operation to the judicial scrutiny of a neutral
20 3
magistrate.
A finding that instances of outrageous government conduct and
entrapment also implicate the individual's fundamental right of privacy would have important consequences for government undercover operations. First, a citizen could only be targetted by the
government for a planned undercover operation 20 4 based upon an
articulable and reasonable suspicion that the individual is involved
202. Osborn, 385 U.S. at 352 n.14 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
203. The Supreme Court has stated that by requiring the use of a warrant
authorized by a neutral magistrate, "we minimize the risk of unreasonable assertions of executive authority." Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 759 (1979).
Historically, the absence of carefully drawn and limited warrants for searches
of private places and effects was considered one of the prime causes of the
American Revolution. United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 69 (1950)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting), overruled in part, Chimel v. California, 395 U.S.
768 (1969). Moreover, the warrant requirement has been viewed by the Court
as "an important working part of our machinery of government, operating as a
matter of course to check the 'well-intentioned but mistakenly overzealous executive officers' who are a part of any system of law enforcement." Coolidge v.
New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 481 (1971). See also ROSCOE POUND, AMERICAN
TRIAL LAWYERS FOUNDATION, ANNUAL CHIEF JUSTICE EARL WARREN CONFERENCE ON ADVOCACY IN THE UNITED STATES 14 (1974) (no electronic surveillance

should be conducted without a court order); Gershman, Staged Arrest, supra
note 63, at 633-38 (warrant requirement urged in undercover operations).
204. A preplanned undercover "sting" operation involves a carefully formulated and concerted effort by law enforcement officials to infiltrate and terminate suspected criminal activity. It is comprehensive by its nature and typically
includes the sustained use of extensive electronic surveillance including consensual recording devices, undercover operatives, targetted suspects, and government established "cover" operations. For a discussion of the undercover tactics
used by the government in the ABSCAM investigations, see United States v.
Carpentier, 689 F.2d 21 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1108 (1983). See also
Marx, supra note 9 (several undercover operations involving various police
practices discussed). The recommendations posed by this article are limited to
comprehensive and sustained government undercover operations and do not apply to conventional investigatory practices.
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predicate necessary to justify targetting a suspect should be measured against an objective standard 206 to avoid arbitrary intrusions
into a citizen's private life and to ensure compliance with guarantees of due process and equal protection. Second, the courts should
20 8
20 7
subject to the usual exceptions,
generally require a warrant,
whenever law enforcement officials seek to execute a comprehensive undercover operation utilizing surreptitious, electronic surveillance against a targetted individual. A warrant requirement would
205. See United States v. Batres-Santolino, 521 F. Supp. 744, 752 (N.D. Cal.
1981) (government undercover operation improper where defendants were not
embarked or about to embark on criminal activity). The minimal requirement
that the government possess an articulable and reasonable suspicion of criminality before targetting an individual is consistent with Supreme Court decisions that limit the unconstrained exercise of discretion by government officials
in situations involving minimal yet protected intrusions into the private life of
individuals. See, e.g., Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438 (1980) (reasonable and articulable suspicion of criminality required before subjecting travellers to investigatory stop and seizure at airport terminal); Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47 (1979)
(reasonable and articulable suspicion of criminality required before police can
stop individuals and demand identification); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648
(1979) (articulable and reasonable suspicion required before selectively stopping
and detaining automobile operators); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (articulable and reasonable suspicion of criminal activity required before police can
stop and frisk a suspect). See also Note, Entrapment in the Federal Courts:
Sixty Years of Frustration,10 NEw ENG. L. REV. 179, 218-19 (1974) (discusses
various federal standards required in order to target a defendant for
investigation).
206. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968) (articulable and reasonable suspicion measured against an objective standard); see also Scott v. United States, 436
U.S. 128, 137 (1978); Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 96-97 (1964).
207. The Warrant Clause of the fourth amendment provides that "no Warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be
seized." U.S. CONST. amend. IV. In Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921),
the Supreme Court stated:
[W]hether entrance to the home or office of a person suspected of a crime be
obtained by a representative of any branch or subdivision of the Government of the United States by stealth, or through social acquaintance,or in
the guise of a business call, and whether the owner be present or not when
he enters, any search and seizure subsequently and secretly made in his
absence,falls within the scope of the prohibitionof the FourthAmendment
Id. at 306 (emphasis added). See also Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. 323, 34446 (1966) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (urging warrant requirement in undercovertype operations); Tybor, Entrapment, supra note 92, at 4 col. 2 (legislation will
likely be introduced requiring a warrant for undercover operations).
208. See, e.g., United States v. Oliver, 104 S. Ct. 1735 (1984) ("open fields"
exception discussed); South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976) ("inventory" exception discussed); United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976) (search
incident to lawful arrest discussed); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218
(1973) ("consent" exception discussed); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S.
443 (1971) ("plain view" exception discussed); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)
("stop and frisk" exception discussed); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298-99
(1967) ("hot pursuit" exception discussed); Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20,
30 (1925) (search "incident to arrest" discussed).
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protect the suspect against unrestricted discretion by law enforcement agents in recording selective conversations. It would also preclude excessive government reliance on consensual recording
practices 20 9 beyond the scrutiny of an impartial magistrate except
209. See United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971) (plurality) (recording
devices carried secretly by consenting undercover agent constitute an exception
to the warrant requirement). The fictitious consent theory established in
White, however, is seriously flawed as it relates to the privacy expectations of
the individual. Furthermore, the "consent" exception as articulated in White
has been improperly expanded by law enforcement officials whenever it is applied to government agents actively involved in an undercover "sting" operation.
There are several reasons why consensual recording devices violate privacy.
First, there is often a substantial difference between the style and content of
recorded versus non-recorded conversations. White, 401 U.S. at 762-63 (Douglas, J. dissenting); Greenwalt, The Consent Problem in Wiretapping and Eavesdropping: Surreptitions Monitoring with the Consent of a ParticipantIn A
Conversation, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 213 (1968). For example, a topic of conversation which is appropriate to a "private" dinner table at a restaurant, nonetheless, may be inappropriate for broadcast to the entire world. See, e.g., Katz, 389
U.S. 347, 352 (1967) (illegal wiretapping of a private telephone conversation constitutes a government-proffered "broadcast to the world"). "Free" conversations take on a distinctively different style and flavor of discourse as compared
to the recorded word. It is ludicrous to contend that private individuals should
reasonably expect that a seemingly "private" conversation among select individuals is being simultaneously recorded or broadcasted to unknown distant parties. Words spoken in confidential settings are often spoken with the
understanding that one's companion will not subject the informal conversation
to literal exactitude or legal precision. Moreover, a growing social awareness of
the unrestrained use of recording devices by government secret agents will
most assuredly result in stifling spontaneous discourse and contribute to social
paranoia. See White, 401 U.S. at 762-63 (Douglas, J., dissenting); Greenwalt,
supra, at 216; Marx, supra note 9.
Second, the risk that a particular conversation with a confidant is being
electronically transmitted and preserved for evidentiary purposes is neither ordinary nor usual. An individual normally must assume that individual's with
whom one confides may breach the trust and provide law enforcement officials
with the proper basis for procuring a necessary search warrant. This type of
risk is quite different from the risk that a participant in a conversation, at any
time and for any reason, may be recording words for an undisclosed undercover
law enforcement investigation. Further, it would be Orwellian indeed for individuals to normally assume that they have been targetted for undercover investigation and may at all times be surrounded by secret government informers.
Thus, it is fundamentally unfair to impose this increased risk of scrutiny and
misinterpretation on an unwitting suspect without consent or judicial scrutiny.
Osborn, 385 U.S. 323, 346-47 (1966) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Greenwalt, supra,
at 218.
Finally, the use of electronic recording devices, by definition, constitutes a
"search and seizure" of words under the fourth amendment. See supra note
182. By allowing a government undercover agent to record private conversations without first specifying the communication sought, the government is effectively utilizing a "general warrant" in violation of the fourth amendment.
See Ashdown, supra note 197, at 1316; Marx, supra note 9, at 34; Greenwalt,
supra note 209, at 216-23. As a result, the unrestricted use of electronic surveillance against criminal suspects may become a substitute for skillful police work
and scientific investigation. Donnelly, Judicial Control of Informants, Spies,
Stool Pigeonsand Agent Provocateurs,60 YALE L.J. 1091, 1111 (1951) (invasions
of privacy and entrapment techniques are a substitute for "skillful and scientific
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in extreme circumstances. Third, evidence procured by the use of
extensive electronic surveillance in the absence of a warrant would
be inadmissible at trial under the Exclusionary Rule.210 These requirements would promote the essential purpose of the fourth
21
amendment which is to impose a standard of "reasonableness" '
upon the exercise of discretion by government officials. 212 The suginvestigation" by police). The notion of allowing the government to consent
away the individual's reasonable expectation of privacy is contrary to the fourth
amendment and is subject to potential abuse.
It is not necessarily the position of this comment that the use of all participant recording devices are per se unconstitutional. Recording devices are very
often used "defensively" by private individuals for legitimate purposes. See e.g.,
Greenwalt, supra note 209, at 214, 224-25. Even the use of such devices for "offensive" purposes by private individuals not connected with the government are
arguably permissible. It is simply urged that in light of the serious social consequences involved the planned use of secret recording devices by the government
for "offensive" purposes against private individuals should be subject to the
warrant requirement of the fourth amendment. To hold otherwise, gives the
government law enforcement apparatus unbridled discretion in targetting private individuals for unspecified reasons beyond the scrutiny of an impartial
magistrate. Id. at 214-21. Aside from the privacy interests at stake in the "consent" exception, it is suggested that law enforcement officials have misinterpreted White whenever participant recording devices are used by actual
government agents in face to face encounters with a suspect. The White case
did not concern the active and sustained involvement of the government itself
in an organized, pre-planned undercover "sting" operation. In White, the informant was a third party who consented to monitor certain criminal conversations with the defendant. While the White Court approved the use of thirdparty electronic monitoring under these limited circumstances, it never endorsed the wholesale use of such practices without a warrant in more extreme
instances of government orchestrated crime. In such instances, the government
has moved beyond the limited use of third-party monitoring and has adapted
the "consent" exception to warrantless surveillance of suspects by the government itsef. This expanded use of the "consent" exception is inconsistent with
not only White but modern notions of the personal right of privacy as well. See
White, 401 U.S. at 755 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (indicates that White opinion
not valid after Katz decision).
210. See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 393 (1914) (Exclusionary Rule
applied to federal courts); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 659 (1961) (Exclusionary
Rule applied to state courts). See also Comment, The Defense of Entrapment:
Next Move-Due Process?,15 UTAH L. REv. 266, 273 (1971) (urges application of
Exclusionary Rule in entrapment cases). The application of the Exclusionary
Rule would prevent the admissibility of illegally obtained evidence at the trial
of a targetted defendant. Presently, undercover operations are governed by internal law enforcement rules. Evidence derived in violation of an internal
agency rule is not subject to the Exclusionary Rule and, thus, may be used
against a defendant at trial. See United States v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 741 (1979)
(evidence derived from I.R.S. agent's violation of internal agency rule against
"consensual electronic surveillance" not subject to Exclusionary Rule).
211. See Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 315 (1978); United States v.
Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878 (1975); Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 439
(1973); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1968); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387
U.S. 523, 539 (1967).
212. A standard of "reasonableness" is imposed by courts upon the exercise
of discretion by government agents, including law enforcement officials, in order "to safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions ....
" Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 312 (1978), quoting Camara
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gested guidelines would also reduce the exposure of the government to lawsuits by innocent third parties injured as a result of
mismanaged undercover operations. 2 13 Most importantly, abusive
practices and unwarranted intrusions into the private lives of the
citizenry would be minimized by submitting all pre-planned undercover operations against targetted individuals to the strictures of
the fourth amendment.
De Lorean and a Privacy Perspective

In De Lorean, the government did not subject the undercover
operation to a prior determination of reasonableness by a neutral
and detached magistrate. The entire operation was governed by the
unfettered discretion of government agents. Although sixty-five
audiotapes and five hours of videotapes were made over a four
month period in 1982, several encounters with De Lorean were
either unrecorded or inaudible. 214 For example, not one of the initial conversations between the government informant and De
Lorean was recorded. 2 15 Also, the principal informant in De
Lorean failed to record critical conversations which the defense
216
claimed contained threats and inducements by the government.
Forms that authorized the videotaping of critical sessions were
back-dated 217 and investigative notes were rewritten by government agents. 2 18 Furthermore, the entire undercover operation was
conducted against an individual who was beset by financial crisis
and who had no criminal background. The government proceeded
against Mr. De Lorean based on the unsubstantiated statements of a
v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967). Accord Arkansas v. Sanders, 442
U.S. 753, 759 (1979); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 554 (1976);
United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 895 (1975); Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 97
(1964).
213. According to a recent House Subcommittee report released in April,
1984, innocent third parties allegedly damaged as a result of undercover operations have filed lawsuits against the government seeking more than $446 million in damages. The Brief, 40 A.C.L.U. OF ILL. at 7 (1984) (background
information concerning program entitled "Undercover Operations and the
Rights of the Innocent").
214. Hoover, A Trial of Images, supra note 1, at 25 (several conversations
not recorded by informant though ordered by F.B.I. agents); Wall St. J., August
17, 1984, at 3, col. 3-4 (initial conversation unrecorded and not corroborated).
215. See supra note 214.
216. See Defendant's Outrageous Government Conduct Memorandum, supra
note 2 at 4.
217. F.B.I. Special Agent John Valestra, posing as a financier named "Vicenza," testified at trial that he had back dated agency forms that formally authorized the videotaping of two important meetings with Mr. De Lorean. N.Y.
Times, August 17, 1984, at B6, col. 4.
218. F.B.I. Special Agent Benjamin Tisa, posing as a banker named "Benedict," testified at trial that he had altered and rewritten some of his investigative notes. N.Y. Times, August 17, 1984, at B6, col. 4.
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paid government informant 2 19 who was an admitted perjurer with a
prior record of drug trafficking. 220 In short, the government initiated an extensive intrusion into the private life of Mr. De Lorean in
a manner which could not have passed scrutiny by a neutral and
detached magistrate. Undoubtedly, the form and extent of the government's invasion of De Lorean's privacy in this instance contributed to his jury acquittal.
As indicated by De Lorean, government undercover operations
can be inefficient and abusive. By their very nature, they involve
an unprecedented and pervasive intrusion on the individual's right
of privacy. The indiscriminate use of con men, cameras, and contraband by the government raises grave constitutional questions that
the entrapment and due process defenses cannot resolve. The modern undercover operation has moved beyond impermissible inducements and police misconduct and has become an all-encompassing
investigatory practice. The threat to constitutional liberty increases
exponentially when government overinvolvement is coupled with a
staged and selectively recorded web of deception and intrigue initiated against a suspect by law enforcement officials. By scrutinizing
such practices under the fourth amendment, courts can not only
prevent undercover operations from overwhelming a targetted individual, but can preserve the integrity and resources of the criminal
justice system as well.
CONCLUSION

In 1886, the Supreme Court warned that "illegitimate and unconstitutional practices get their first footing . . . by silent ap-

'22 1
proaches and slight deviations from legal modes and procedure."
Nowhere is this admonition more true than in the area of law enforcement misconduct. Government undercover operations are
growing in scope and frequency, posing significant problems for
modern courts. While De Lorean may not be typical of most undercover investigations, it illustrates the potential for abuse when law
enforcement agents are allowed to operate with unfettered discretion. Therefore, several recommendations are suggested to clarify
and reform the law concerning government undercover operations.
First, efforts to alter the traditional entrapment defense have
only served to further confound this important defense. Therefore,

219. The initial conversations between informant-Hoffman and De Lorean,
which led to the initiation of the undercover operation, were not corroborated
independently by the F.B.I.. Wall St. J., August 17, 1984, at 3, col. 3-4. Moreover, Mr. Hoffman was reportedly paid $111,643 between January, 1982 and
May, 1984 by the government for his assistance. N.Y. Times, August 17, 1984, at
B6, col. 4-5. See supra note 198 (problems of paid informants discussed).
220. See supra note 98.
221. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 635 (1886).
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courts should accept entrapment as a "limited defense" applicable
only to instances of government instigated crime involving a nonpredisposed defendant. Second, the Supreme Court should expressly recognize and define the due process defense at the earliest
opportunity in order to provide guidance to the lower courts in dealing with instances of outrageous government conduct, regardless of
the culpability of the defendant. There is considerable support for
such a defense in Supreme Court precedents, various lower court
cases, and the De Lorean verdict as well. The four factors articulated in Isaacson222 provide a clear and workable framework for the
defense, and the Supreme Court should adopt them as the proper
inquiries in a due process case. Third, the courts, Congress, and various state legislatures should re-examine the use of comprehensive,
undercover law enforcement operations against private citizens and
expressly apply fourth amendment protections. Further, the government should not target a citizen for extensive, pre-planned undercover investigation without articulable and reasonable suspicion,
measured by an objective standard, that the individual is involved
in criminality. A warrant requirement for all electronic secret surveillance by government agents would reduce the possibility of
abuse and render the actions of such agents accountable, in advance, to a neutral and detached magistrate. Otherwise, the practice of employing unrestricted law enforcement sting operations
threatens to constitute a "silent approach" and "slight deviation"
from proper legal procedure and portends ominous abuse by government law enforcement agencies.
These recommendations serve to strengthen the legitimate interests of law enforcement officials and private citizens. Culpable
individuals would be prosecuted successfully and juries would be
allowed to fulfill their critical function without deviation from carefully formulated jury instructions. For whatever else may emanate
from the De Lorean verdict, the general public has shown that it
will not countenance unrestricted and intrusive government undercover operations that serve to create crime rather than to protect
the public.
Kevin Hackett O'Neill

222. See People v. Isaacson, 44 N.Y.2d 511, 521, 378 N.E.2d 78, 83, 406 N.Y.S.2d
714, 719 (1978). See supra notes 153 & 155 and accompanying text (Isaacsontest
described and endorsed as basis of due process defense).

